March 18-24, 1942:
Pantelleria falls to overwhelming force.
Aegean operations are intense: land, sea and air. Germany makes
some long-term responses.
Allied forces in Peloponesus bogged in a tough struggle with Germans.
Kido Butai attacks Sumatra and Andamans, while Sumatra is collapsing.
MARCH 18th:
Central Mediterranean:
By 0530 the long awaited landing operation against Pantelleria began with
another massive bombardment delivered by Adm. Rawlings' squadron. The three
old Battleships HMS Royal Sovereign, Ramillies, MN Lorraine were the first
to open fire, concentrating against Porto Pantelleria known defences. By
0630, cruisers joined the fray, firing on shore batteries, which opened up,
revealing they were still operational after days of air bombing. At this time,
RN Destroyers Escapade, Ithuriel, Onslow, Westcott, Wishart, and Wrestler
were patrolling a line between Porto Empedocle (on Sicily's coast) and Patelleria
to prevent any MAS boats interference.
By 0710, landing crafts began their run to the beach under the protection
of Destroyers Bedouin, Maori, Matabele, Somali, and Zulu. Heavy infantry weapons
fire greeted landing crafts as well as artillery fire. HMS Bedouin and Somali
entered a fight against batteries, which had opened a murderous fire against
the first LCIs, sinking one and damaging two. Bedouin took two 120mm shells
on her aft superstructure, destroying her quad pom-pom. HMS Somali was hit
too, probably by a 6in shell, under the bridge. However, both ships were
able to distract Italian gunners from firing on the first wave, which hit
the beach at 0732. By then, Ramillies was re-directing her fire and, helped
by Bedouin and by a Walrus spotter plane, silenced the two dangerous batteries
with her 15in.
Men of the 4th New Zealand Brigade took however serious losses and, for
a time, beaches were obscured by smoke and communications interrupted. By
0825 the Brigade commander, who had asked for being authorized to move with
his men in the first wave and has been wounded doing so gave the green light
for the second one. Allied light bombers were in the same time roaming over
the Island to prevent any enemy move toward the beaches, and Allied fighters
were maintaining a constant top-cover over Pantelleria, helped by HMS Illustrious
and Furious planes.
The second wave arrived on the beaches by 0858. Italian defensive fire
has not been totally suppressed by then and losses, if less heavy than for
the first wave were not unsignificant. With the second wave, 14 Valentine-III
tanks were landed.
The Regia Aeronautica reacted soon after and a mixed formation of 17 Fiat
BR-20 and 9 CANT Z-1007b "Alcyone" escorted by 30 Macchi MC-200 and 202 tried
to attack the fleet. They were quickly overwhelmed by 48 Allied fighters,
which were guided by HMS Charybdis radar. No less than 19 Italian bombers
and 15 fighters were shot down against 11 Allied fighter lost. At 1020 another
formation of 14 Italian Ju-87 (all that was left of "Tuffatori" Gruppi) escorted
by 12 Fiat G-50 made an attempt against Adm. Rawlings CV but was also quickly
jumped by Illustrious Martlet-IIs and Furious Fulmar. Nine italian dive-bombers
were shot down even before approaching of the Fleet as well as 5 Fiat fighters.
Surviving Ju-87 attacked the Destroyer patrol line and succeeded in seriously
damaging HMS Escapade.
British and French general reconnaissance and ASW planes were very active
to prevent interference by Axis submarines. Hudson-III belonging to Aeronavale
E1 and E5 flotillas, helped by RAF n° 223 and 500 Sqn planes patrolled
over the straits. This aerial screen was quite effective. The German U-97
was bombed and sunk at 1030 50nm of Tarento an E5 Hudson, Italian submarine
Malachite was attacked by a RAF Hudson at 1450 off the western Sicily coast.
The boat was bombed when operating at periscope depth and was seen surfacing
and then sinking by the plane crew. Another submarine was attacked soon before
dusk off Porto Empedocle by a 500 Sqn Hudson-III. The boat was then attacked
and depth-charged by Onslow. Time and location of the attack correspond to
the loss of Italian submarine Onice.
The battle ashore was still very hotly disputed. By 1145, helped by Valentine
tanks, Freyberg's troops were reaching Pantelleria airfield. The third wave,
including the divisional artillery was now coming ashore. However Italian
troops were not giving up. HMS Zulu had to close the beach to the point of
stricking ground to silence a 120mm which had been though to be destroyed
by Ramillies fire.
By 1500 the airfield was under New-Zealandese troops control. Part of the
4th Field Regiment (RHA) 25-pounder Field Gun/Howitzer have been landed and
they were able to directly support troops attacking Italian strong points.
Coming from nearby Bizerte, French LCI(L) and small coasters began to enter
Porto Pantelleria harbour with elements of the 4th Moroccan Mountain Infantry
Division (Gen. de Hesdin). Tabors went ashore by 1730 even if the lack of
specialised landing crafts was slowing down unloading heavy equipment. By
night the Allied beach head had expanded up to Pantelleria Lake, but Italian
troops were still fighting.
Peloponnesus:
Gen. Juin had spent a part of the night visiting units involved in "Agamemnon"
and speaking with their commanding officers. By early morning he and his
staff had understood the need to thoroughly review "Agamemnon". Clearly,
German and Italian forces (including now elements of the 14th "Isonzo" Infantry
division and possibly parts of the 131st "Centauro" Armoured division) were
more numerous and better entrenched than expected. Considering losses sustained
so far, the poor logistic situation of advanced Allied forces, particularly
the difficulty to move artillery ammunitions in needed quantities, he decided
to suspend the attack. After conferring with Gen. Ritchie, it was decided
to prepare another operation, code-named "Nestor".
A two-pronged attack, delivered by French troops on the high ground highway
and by British troops along the coast would be coordinated with a direct amphibious
attack at Nafplio (Nauplie) by the Polish SBSK brigade and a squadron of
infantry support tanks from the 32nd Armoured Brigade. The aim of the operation
was to achieve a two-fold encirclement, one on the coastal plain and the
second one of the whole Argos-Nauplie area. Would "Nestor" succeed, it would
lead to the destruction of the best German and Italian troops in Greece.
The complexity of "Nestor" and the need to refit troops before attacking
mandated a break of some days in the attack. Axis forces were to be prevented
to pour more reinforcements in the Peloponnesus and the Aegean squadron was
asked to interfere as much as possible with Axis coastal naval traffic.
In Athens GenOberst E. Rommel called Berlin early in the day for the sending
to another Mountain Infantry Division. His demand, first denied by the OKH
was however approved by Hitler late afternoon. The 3rd Mountain Infantry Division
was to move from Tyrol where it was training to Venice, and then embark of
a coastal convoy to go to Patras. The whole move was estimated to take 8
days.
Northern Greece and Aegean:
Another relatively quiet day over northern Aegean. German reconnaissance
planes are quite active over Limnos and Lesbos, but no raid is launched against
both Islands or Allied naval traffic.
After discussing with Aegean Theatre of Operation Allied Commander, R.Adm
Vian decides to split his force. The main element, centered around French
CVE Bois-Belleau, is to operate in support of Limnos, with CLAA HMS Cairo,
Dido (F) and DD HMS Paladin Gurkha, MN Mogador, Guepard, Verdun (all three
French large destroyers have been AA refitted and would contribute to the
Bois-Belleau screen with the two RN AA cruisers). A strike element is to
attack Axis coastal traffic to disrupt the enemy logistic chain. This force,
under Cpt. W.G. "Bill" Agnew command is to be composed of CL HMS Delhi (F),
MN La Galissonnière, DD HMS Pakenham, Panther, Partridge and Pathfinder.
Another strike element, centered around the fastest ships available and under
MN C.V. Perzo command is also to attack coastal traffic and provide for minelaying
operations with Large DD MN Le Fantasque (F), L'Indomptable, Le Terrible,
fast minelayer HMS Welshman. To Welshman mines could be added 50 Breguet mines
for each French Contre-Torpilleurs. Then a light squadron is to check Axis
light forces activities, with the three French TB L'Incomprise, La Poursuivante,
Branlebas, and 8 MGB's with 12 MTB's manned by French, Greek, Yugoslav and
British sailors.
Soon after to comply with Allied forces in Peloponnesus commander, Gen. Juin,
C.V. Perzo's force and the light squadron leave Mytilene to Naxos, via Chios
where the three French Contre-Torpilleurs are to load mines. As loading of
mines was slow in Chios, the light squadron had to spend the whole night
before moving early on the 19th to Naxos. Vian himself leaves Mytilene with
the two other Aegean squadron elements by 1200 openly to escort three light
coasters loaded with Greek troops which are to relieve Col. Gambiez' men
on Agiestratos. As night comes, and the large force escorting the three small
and slow Greek merchantmen is still three hours from Agiestratos, Vian dispatches
Agnew's element at high speed north, toward Alexandropoulis.
Malaya / Singapore:
Singapore is raided twice by IJNAF planes based at Kuching. During the second
raid, two coasters are set ablaze in the civilian harbour. Lord Gort orders
evacuation of "all personnel not directly needed to the defence of Singapore".
MARCH 19th
Berlin:
This day was to see a dramatic meeting at Karinhall, Goering's official
den. In the very morning met at the Reich Ministry of the Air, Goering, Ernst
Udet then Luftwaffe Quartermaster-General and Ltn-Gen. Jeschonnek, the Luftwaffe
Chief of Staff. The meeting official reason was to review the Luftwaffe situation
in Greece and the Aegean and to organize stable resupply air units operating
in this theatre without disrupting preparations for the attack against Russia.
A first point raised was the relative ineffectiveness of Regia Aeronautica
anti-shipping units in conditions of heavy air opposition. Jeschonnek explained
that RA fighters lacked performances and range to protect Ju-87 dive-bombers.
Losses had been heavy and Italian units were to be re-equipped with the Ju-87D-1
now coming from the Berlin-Tempelhof factory. However, production rate have
been quite slow during winter and if Regia Aeroanutica re-supply would not
to interfere with the oncoming operation in the East then the Bremen factory
of the "Weser" scheme was to be phased in.
Another problem which had plagued the RA response to allied naval operations
was the fact that torpedo launching planes were extremely vulnerable when
attacking. The Luftwaffe solution to this problem was known, but not fully
developed, the guided missile. Answering Goering's question, Jeschonnek could
precise that the Lehr un ErprobungsKommando 36 at Usedom on the Baltic coast
was fully engaged debugging the Hs-293 and the FX-1400 missiles. This last
had still serious control problems. A proposal of sending the LEK-36 to Foggia
(Italia) had to be cancelled viewing the relative southern Italy vulnerability
to Allied air attacks. By late March the LEK-36 would move to the former French
base at Istres where weather could be expected to be better than on the Baltic
to speed-up the process of putting the two missiles in operational use. There
would however be a problem about the carrier plane. It has been planned initially
that the He-177 would be the standard Luftwaffe anti-shipping bomber. However
the plane, still nicknamed the "Luftwaffenfeuerzeug" (The Lufwaffe's Lighter)
was far to be ready. First deliveries by Arado's Warnemünde plant of
the He-177A-1 were expected for the end of the month but at best the plane
could not be operational before late summer. So far, the Do-217E-5 and the
K-2 variant were to be prime guided-missiles carriers.
However the discussion soon degenerated when it came to the mauling Zerstörer
units operating from Salonika have suffered. When Goering, who had been asked
by Hitler when the attack against Limnos could take place and why air operations
against Allied forces in the Aegean were not stepped up, inquired for the
date the new Me-210 would be available to front-line units, both Udet and
Jeschonnek had to tell the Reichsmarschall that production had to be stopped
by late February. Production planes were still patently unsafe and dangerous,
spinning at the least provocation. This was leaving Messerchmitt-Augsburg
and MIAG concerns with 184 planes completed (not including "v" numbered development
planes) and 370 in various states of construction but none available for
the Luftwaffe, probably one of the greatest German air industry blunder.
This was a catastrophe of major proportions as the Me-210 was intended to
fulfill not just the "Heavy Fighter" Zerstörer role but also the one
of an advanced Stuka plane and a fast bomber (Schnellbomber) in addition.
Quite clearly too much had been expected from the same design.
The only solution was to step-up Bf-110F production (which has fallen to
4 planes a month last February) till Messerschmitt could introduce in production
the 110G variant and correct Me-210 major deficiencies with a new variant
called the Me-410. The Bf-110F had also to fill the gap led by the Henschel-129B
programme for a ground attack plane. Some 110F variants are to be up-armoured
and equipped with a belly container armed with a BK-37 37mm gun. Messerschmitt
has agreed to rebuild some of existing Me-210 held in Luftwaffe storage units,
but even if flying performances could be made acceptable by fitting a new
fuselage aft part and wing leading-edge slots, performances would still be
significantly under ones of the new US twin-engined fighter French pilots
were operating over the Aegean. In its "pure" Zerstörer variant the
Me-210 was not expected to have a maximum speed over 350mph at rated altitude.
The new Me-410 was to be fitted with significantly more powerful (but also
heavier) DB 603A engine and could be expected to reach 388 mph at rated altitude.
In any case the program was seriously delayed as rebuilt planes would not
be delivered before next July and the new Me-410 would not be available before
March 1943.
Udet had to admit that he had never sent to Willy Messerschmitt, who was
a friend of him, the letter he wrote in July 1941 and announcing "this situation...compel
me to impose a higher standard of supervision over your new design". Jeschonnek
had to inform Goering that the only possible move could be the transfer to
Salonika of the ZG-1 now operating from bases in Netherlands, Belgium and
Northern France, even if Bf-110E&F equipping this unit were clearly no
match for the new US-built twin-engines fighter the French Air Force was operating.
The fact that what he had ever seen as Luftwaffe "elite" units, the Zerstörer
Gruppen, were to be left without a modern aircraft before the next year put
Goering into deep anger.
Jeschonnek had to admit too that the Luftwaffe lacked heavy bombers able
to attack allied base in Northern Africa or in Rhodes from northern Greece
and that the new He-177 would not be ready before early 1943 at best. Production
charts Udet showed to Goering showed a drop after September 1941 exactly
as production has dropped in November 1940 after the Battle of Britain (this
diagram, well known from historians, belongs to Programme No. 24c of the
Luftwaffe's Technical Office, dated February 19, 1942). This aroused Goering's
anger even if he was the one who had personally ordered the relative production
slowing down by end 1941. In a bout of furore he called work of the two generals
treason and then, in front of an amazed Jeschonnek and a dismayed Udet, took
his phone to call Field-Marshal Milch and put him personally in charge to
see that production "over the whole field of air armament would be quadrupled
in the shortest time". Then, Goering asked Udet to transfer Milch all information
the latter would need and to take a two-weeks leave.
Central Mediterranean
During the night, several groups of MAS boats tried to attack the Allied
fleet around Pantelleria. RN destroyers HMS Nizam and RAN HMAS Norman repulsed
a first attack by 0050. A second one, by 0215 ended in amore serious fight
where 4 Italian boats were sunk, but RN destroyer Ithuriel was torpedoed
east of Pantelleria (the ship sank just before dawn) and cruiser HMS Newcastle
was hit by a torpedo just under "B" turret. Escorted by HMS Napier and Nestor,
the ship sailed to Bizerte for first repairs before going to Gibraltar. By
0530 the damaged destroyer HMS Escapade was sunk by the Italian submarine
Uarsciek 20nm off Malta. This submarine was later in the day sunk by a French
PBY-5 of the flotilla E22.
On Pantelleria, fighting has gone on during the whole night. Italian troops
had attacked twice New-Zealandese infantry guarding the airfield, the second
attack, by 0510 being so strong and determined that Gen. Freyberg asked for
naval support, which was delivered by French CA Dupleix and British CL Sheffield.
By 0830 Allied troops resumed their attack against Italian positions, helped
by Valentine tanks and, between 0930 to 1100, intermittent fire from Battleships
Royal Sovereign and Lorraine.
By early afternoon, Italian troops had been progressively repulsed to the
eastern hilly part of the Island, where they were continuously bombed by Allied
planes.
The Regia Aeronautica launched only one raid in the day, when 12 CANT Z-1007b
"Alcyone" belonging to the 86° and 96° Gruppi, escorted by 18 Macchi
MC-200 and 202, tried to attack the Fleet by 0930. Soon detected, the raid
was intercepted by 36 Allied fighters vectored by HMS Charybdis, and lost
9 bombers and 11 fighters against 7 Allied fighters.
Peloponnesus:
The day was relatively calm on the northeast as both sides were licking
their wounds. As Allied forces were preparing for operation "Nestor", Gen.
Rommel tried to expedite the sending of reinforcements to German and Italian
troops around Argos and Nauplie.
On the Northwest, French troops belonging to the Billotte divisions tried
to push toward Patras but were soon blocked by a strong Italo-German resistance.
Central-South Aegean.
Having left Chios early in the day, the four ships under C.V. Perzo command
reached Naxos early in the afternoon. After spending some time to prepare
camouflage nets as if they were expecting to stay there, the ships left Naxos
just after dusk.
By 2000, the light squadron accelerated to 33kts and sailed toward the
Saronic Gulf. By 2300 the four ships were manoeuvring between Poros and Aigina
Islands.
Northern Greece and Aegean:
By 0045 Cpt. Agnew's squadron has arrived off Alexandropoulis harbour. Helped
by a Mudros based AT-11 Northrop N3M floatplanes which was launching flares
over the harbour, the six ships began a thorough bombardment of the light
shipping accumulated in the little bay, soon destroying or putting ablaze
small coasters and large fishing boats which were intended to carry German
troops to Limnos. The bombardment is stopped at 0150 and all ships sail at
high speed south so to be under Bois-Belleau F4F-3 and Limnos based fighters
cover by dawn, rounding Samothrace Island by 0410. By 0600 Agnew's squadron
was well under the cover both of Bois-Bellau F4F-3 and of Lesbos based P-38.
The news that some crafts allocated to the attack against Limnos had been
destroyed by a naval bombardment and that culprits had escaped any Luftwaffe
retaliation (actually Kesselring was husbanding his forces to deliver what
he hoped to be a knock-out blow at the beginning of the "Theseus" operation)
put Hitler in one of his furore when he learnt the fact just before noon.
He summoned then Goering and Adm. Raeder to a momentous meeting (to which
Halder was present too), which lasted part of the afternoon. After a two hours
long speech about how himself, Adolf Hitler, was understanding politics of
war even better than Clausewitz he ordered Goering to begin without delay
the destruction through air attacks of all Allied assets in Northern Aegean
and asked Raeder to send a "substantial" submarine force in the Mediterranean
to "completely destroy British and French" ships. As Franz Halder would put
in his Diaries, Hitler insulted both Goering and Raeder before cooling down
a little. Only Raeder's to send as soon as possible a "significant submarine
force" in the Mediterranean allowed Hitler to quiet.
This operation, first called "Blue Light II" and then Rosselssprüng
(the "Horseman Jump", a term used in chess), was to have significant strategic
consequences and is to be separately analysed.
Kuching Bay:
R. Adm Kubo concentrates his 4th Surprise attack force with Nishimura's
one to cover a 22 ships convoy.
Kendari (Celebes).
V.Adm Nagumo's force leaves Kendari late in the afternoon to sail south.
MARCH 20th:
Central Mediterranean:
New-Zealandese and Moroccan troops are slowly progressing toward the Pantelleria
Island eastern part during the day, as British and French bombers are continuously
bombing Italian positions. By 1930, seeing his position hopeless the Italian
Admiral in command of the Island garrison accepts to surrender to Gen. Freyberg.
Some resistance pockets will fight till the day after.
Central-South Aegean.
At 0015 French Contre-Torpilleurs Le Fantasque (F), L'Indomptable, Le Terrible
and fast minelayer HMS Welshman broke into the Megara Gulf. They were beginning
to lay mines they were transporting when the British-made Radar set on L'indomptable
detected small ships slightly north. Letting HMS Welshman and MN Le Terrible
to complete the minelaying, C.V. Perzo ordered Le Fantasque and L'Indomptable
to attack. Accelerating over 33kts the two ships charged was actually was
a slow convoy of Greek caïques and German Siebel ferries. Both ships
opened fire at 0037, the 138mm guns scoring several hits. The two Contre-torpilleurs
were then challenged by what they though to be MTBs (and actually were Italian
motor launches). Accelerating to 37kts they turned to face what they though
a threat but soon discovered that the huge waves they were creating manoeuvring
at high speed were highly detrimental to heavily loaded Siebel Ferries stability.
By 0051 French gunners had set ablaze 3 motor-launches (mostly with their
AA guns as the 138mm one were moving too slowly at very very close range)
and both ships returned to finish the convoy, which had in the meantime dispersed.
By 0135 the four ships left the Megara Gulf through the straits between Salamis
and Aigina, sailing southeast at 35 kts.
This raid considerably surprised the German local command, not only because
men and vehicles belonging to the 15th PanzerDivision were lost but also
because a small Greek coaster blew up at 1050 in the morning on mines left.
Naval traffic was interrupted during all the day till a channel could be
swept.
Peloponnesus:
There is a lull in ground operations as both sides are preparing for the
second round at Argos-Nauplie. The Aegean Air Force tried to interfere with
Axis operations in the Megara Gulf, among others minesweeping done by Italian
MS RD 22, 23, 36 and 38. However, JG27 and JG3 fighters were present in numbers.
The Aegean Air Force lost 5 Blenheim light bombers, 3 RAF P-40E end 2 French
P-39D against 3 Bf-109 fighters. However, damaged by bombs, the RD 23 had
to be beached.
Northern Greece and Aegean:
Under strict Hitler and Goering order, Marshal Kesselring launched the much
waited for Axis air offensive in Northern Aegean (operation "Theseus"). By
combining the IInd and the Xth FliegerKorps he had 275 operational combat
planes under his command for this particular operation (on a total of 561
deployed by German and Italian units on the whole Greek theatre), not including
the 348 transport and glider-tug planes now crowding airfields around Salonika,
Kavalla and Alexandropoulis.
German offensive operations resumed this day first with a raid against
Mudros. By 0940 27 KG77 Ju-88 escorted by 40 Bf-109 were detected by the
Limnos radar. The raid was intercepted at 0953 by 12 RAF 244th Wing P-40E
and 8 GC III/1 Spitfire V. Twelve German planes were to fall under Allied
fighters machine guns (5 Ju-88 and 7 Bf-109) but 7 allied planes (4 P-40E
and 3 Spitfire were destroyed in the air or landing on the damaged runway).
By 1020 another raid was detected and Limnos GCI called the Mytilene-based
P-38 standing patrol. 12 P-38 were vectored to a formation of 27 KG-26 He-111
escorted by 24 JG77 Bf-109. The enemy formation was joined by 1037 and by
this time a third raid has been detected, still coming toward Mudros. This
time 6 P-40E and 4 Spitfire V took-off, some under bombs already falling,
to intercept 15 LG1 Ju-88 escorted by 16 Bf-109 of the III/JG77. In the same
time the He-111 formation has been intercepted losing 6 bombers and 5 escort
fighters to the cost of 6 P-38 (of which actually 4 were destroyed but two
others so much damaged that they had to crash-land at Mudros). One He-111
was destroyed by Mudros AA guns. At 1058 Limnos surviving fighters were attacking
the third raid as the GCI officer desperately asked Mytilene for more fighters.
12 more P-38 were scrambled as the LG1 was losing 4 Ju-88 and the III/JG77
3 Bf-109 against 3 P-40E and 1 Spitfire destroyed. The surviving LG1 bombers
delivered a terribly effective dive-bombing attack, destroying two more P-40E
and Spitfire on the ground. By 1105 a fourth raid appeared on the radar screen
and the recently scrambled P-38 were sent to investigate, founding soon 24
STG/1 and STG/2 Ju-87 escorted by 12 JG-53 Bf-109. The twin-engined fighters
downed 7 Ju-87 and 3 Bf-109, losing 5 of their owns in the process, but at
least 12 Stuka got through and delivered another hammer blow on the airfield
at 1130.
A short lull till early afternoon occurred. Limnos airfield was in shambles.
Of the 19 P-40E belonging to the 244th Wing (n°3, 450 - RAAF) and the
14 GC III/1 Spitfire, only 9 P-40E and 6 Spitfire were still in flyable condition.
They were scrambled at 1410 to intercept the fifth raid of the day, 18 KG-77
Ju-88 escorted by 24 JG-53 Bf-109. At 1425 another raid was on the screen
and Limnos radar vectored 8 P-38 to intercept 12 LG1 Ju-88 escorted by 24
JG-77 Bf-109. The fifth raid lost 3 Ju-88 and 4 Bf-109 to the cost of 3 P-40E
and 2 Spitfire, but one more P-40E and 2 Spitfire were destroyed on the ground
by the 6th raid, which had lost 3 Ju-88 and 3 Bf-109 to the cost of 4 P-38.
It was then 1458 and the Limnos fighter force had to any extent been whipped
out by successive attacks. The Mytilene based AdA 2nd Fighter Wing made a
maximum effort to maintain a permanent 8 planes standing patrol over Limnos
till the end of the day, but could not prevent KG-26 He-111 to attack Mudros
in the post-dusk twilight.
Considering the level of attack, A.V.M. Tedder signalled that an airborne
attack against Limnos was possible for the next day and he asked the Aegean
squadron to take position out of Limnos during the night. R.Adm Vian ordered
soon after his ships to a position between Limnos and Agiestratos, the squadron
reached just after mid-night.
MARCH 21st
Munchen:
Meeting between Hitler, with Halder and Keitel at his sides and Mussolini
who came from Roma with his chief of Staff Marshal-Count Cavallero. Hitler
adamantly refuses to cancel or even postpone the attack against Soviet Union
and his only concessions to a very worried Mussolini was a promise the German
industry will deliver 600 DB-601 engines a month to Italy from May onwards.
(This promise was never fully fulfilled and deliveries of German engines
were ever under targets and somewhere erratic. More important was the fact
that never Hitler authorised the selling of advanced machine tools to Italy,
compromising the Alfa-Romeo attempt to license build the DB-601 and its 605
successor. This however opened a window of opportunity for a former racing-car
driver, turned team-manager and now entrepreneur whose factory, situated
not far from Modena, has specialised in producing German high-precision machine-tool
copies.)
Central Mediterranean:
As the last Italian resistance pockets surrender on Pantelleria, French
and British engineers are already working hard to put the airfield back in
use, something which is hoped to be achieved by the end of the month.
Peloponnesus:
The fighting on the found is relatively still as allied forces are hurriedly
preparing for operation "Nestor". The French 7th Fighter Wing (Escadre de
Chasse) complete its transfer to K-1 where it meets the Yugoslav manned GC
III/80, all these units are flying on P-40E (Hawk-87). K-1 is also to house
Yugoslav GB I/81 and II/81 Maryland light bombers. The airfield runway is
however still too short to allow P-39D to be based. These planes both Yugoslav
manned and French, which are playing an important role as close-support fighters,
are still to operate from Crete.
Greece mainland:
Under heavy fighter escort, the new Italian Aegean squadron with Large DD
(Tarigo class) Pancaldo and Pessagno, DD Geniere and Lanciere (Soldati class),
old DD Eubo, Turbine, Francesco Crispi and Quintinio Sella, Torpedo-boats
Circe, Lupo, and seaplane-carrier Giuseppe Miraglia, leaves Piraeus in company
of German S35 and S56 MTBs at 0500 to move north toward Salonika. Because
of the heavy fight in Northern Aegean, this move is not opposed by the Allied
Aegean Air Force. All ships enter Salonika harbour by 2230.
Northern Greece and Aegean:
The night had been relatively quiet but, at 0630, the AdA 13th Fighter Wing
launched 16 NA-73 in four elements of 4 planes to attack Salonika area airfield
in the hope of cutting losses in raids to come. Flying low over the sea from
Chios the 16 planes arrived over Salonika by 0745 in two elements of four
and one of eight planes. The first two airfields were apparently empty, but
with a very reactive light Flak and 4 NA-73 were lost to 20mm and 37mm guns.
The third one happened to be the main IInd FliegerKorps base and 13th FW
planes ran into KG-77 and JG-53 planes gathering for a raid which was aiming
at the Mytilene airfield complex. The NA-73 arrival was a complete surprise
and the 8 airplanes destroyed 7 Ju-88 and 3 Bf-109 before German pilots and
Flak crews began to react. In a succession of low altitude dogfights, the
French pilots lost three of their owns to German fighters, but downed 4 in
return and lost a fourth plane to the light Flak, which apparently downed
two Bf-109 too.
More than losses inflicted, this operation was important because it disrupted
the IInd FK attack pattern for a part of the day. However the Xth FK had already
left its nest, launching simultaneously 18 Ju-88 and 18 Ju-87 escorted by
32 Bf-109. Aimed at Limnos, this raid was intercepted at 0835 by 12 P-38 of
the "dawn patrol". Actually, Mytilene based planes were intercepting only
part of the raid as the 18 Ju-87 and 8 escorting Bf-109 have been diverted
by the German formation commander to attack ships they had sighted. Two air
battles then occurred at less then 25nm apart, as 12 Bois-Belleau F4F-3 have
been scrambled as Dido's radar was detecting the incoming raid.
The Mytilene based P-38 succeeded in destroying 4 Ju-88 and 5 Bf-109 but
lost 4 of them. The raid against Mudros was again highly effective, taking
away the GCI radar station. Bois-Belleau fighters were more successful, or
may be the smaller German fighter screen was unable to prevent them to gat
at the slow Ju-87, 9 were destroyed as well as 3 Bf-109 against 4 F4F-3. The
Aegean squadron escaped a serious bombing even if 2 bombs fell uncomfortably
close to MN Mogador.
Kesselring had hoped to achieve a knockout blow by successive attacks staged
on two days and by attacking the obviously critical Mytilene base. However,
the 13th FW morning strike had somewhat spoiled his plan. The presence of
an Allied naval squadron near Limnos was also meaning that any attempt to
move troops by sea would be risky. The nearly total destruction of Italian
ships just days before was still fresh in memory. By 1100 Kesselring sent
a signal to Gen. Geisler and Loerzer stating that the destruction of enemy
ships operating in Northern Aegean had the utmost priority.
By 1320 Ju-88 shadowers began to close to the Aegean squadron. Bois-Belleau
fighters dispatched two of them but two others escaped. That could only mean
that a major raid was on the coming and R.Adm Vian, who was retiring his ships
toward Lesbos, asked Mytilene for more fighters. Knowing that after Limnos
airfield and fighter force neutralisation only Aegean Squadron ships stood
between Limnos and the enemy, the 2nd FW commanding officer scrambled two
8 planes patrols and asked his maintenance crews to have as much planes possible
in readiness.
By 1545 Dido's radar detected a large raid, actually 18 Ju-87, 15 Ju-88
escorted by 32 Bf-109 for a Xth FK all-out effort. Bois-Belleau scrambled
10 F4F-3 (all that was left in operational condition). The interception took
place 10nm northwest of Lesbos Island. Even with drop-tanks, German fighters
were at the limit of their operational radius of action. Still they prevented
very aggressive French pilots to completely disrupt the attack. The combination
of 8 P-38 and 10 F4F-3 levied a toll of 8 Ju-87, 5 Ju-88 and 6 Bf-109 against
3 P-38 and 4 F4F-3 lost. However Ju-87 and Ju-88 put one bomb (and two near-misses)
on Bois-Belleau something whose the ship mercantile-built hull could not sustain.
A massive fire developed quickly, leading to successive petrol explosions.
By 1615 fires were out of control and the ship had to be evacuated with heavy
losses among her crew before being sunk by one torpedo from HMS Panther. This
was not to be the only loss. Very precise and determined German crews put
also two bombs on the old cruiser HMS Cairo and on destroyer Paladin. This
last sank quickly, her depth charges exploding soon after the second hit.
The old Cairo, who had been converted into an AA cruiser before the war and
had been instrumental in air-control over northern Aegean after Euralyus loss
could not swallow two German 1000lbs bombs and sank by 1642. However, the
Aegean high AA fire concentration had led to the loss of two more Ju-88 and
one Ju-87.
If successful, this strike had cost much to the Xth FK whose commander, Gen.
Geisler, when he received an enthusiastic phone call from Goering congratulating
him for the sinking of one aircraft-carriers and two cruisers, answered "another
success like this one and the Korps is out of the anti-shipping business for
a while".
In the evening, A.V.M. Tedder met with his staff and decided to send two
Hurricane equipped squadrons to Mytilene for possible transfer to Limnos once
the airfield back in operation. Units chooses were SAAF n°1 Sqn and RAF
n° 605 Sqn. Both the RAF 244 wing and the French GC III/1 were to be retired,
as they have practically no planes left any more to fly. During the night
21 Adam Consolidated -32 bombers attacked airfields near Kavalla hoping to
disrupt German preparations. The bombing, despite the Gee navigation aid
was moderately successful and one Consolidated-32 was downed by a Bf-110 night-fighter.
Malaya / Singapore:
Another day of heavy bombing against Singapore, this time by IJAAF bombers.
Japanese ground forces are regrouping around Johore as IJA engineers try
to put some airfields back in use for IJAAF close-support planes.
MARCH 22nd:
Berlin:
After a long discussion the previous night with his own chief-of-staff,
Major-General Ploch who has been fired on March 20th by Milch with nearly
all his staff, Ernst Udet, still officially Luftwaffe Quartermaster-General
but actually a man completely deprived of all his former power, shot his self.
He just let a written note on the headboard of his bed: "Reichsmarschall,
why have you deserted me?".
When learning that Udet had committed suicide Goering's reaction showed
his real feelings: "I can only be glad that Udet dealt personally with his
own case. Otherwise I should have been obliged to proceed against him myself".
Peloponnesus:
At 0500 British infantry belonging to the 50th Infantry Division and to
4th Indian Infantry division elements began to move to Timerlio. Operation
"Nestor" was on. French armoured units resumed their advance toward Borsas
and Fichti north of Argos, as French infantry, now backed by US light M3
tanks of Col. Todd 1st Battalion, 13th Armoured Regiment attacked toward Akova.
At the same time, escorted by a naval force made of DE Middleton, Adrias**
and Krite** (Greek), Corv. HMS Delphinium, Erica, Pindos** and Apostolis**
(Greek), MS Boston, Seham, Hebe, Speedy, Rye, Hythe 6 PC boats (US built,
light ASW) manned by MN and Greek crews, 8 MGB’s (Greek, RN, MN) and 8 MTB's
(Greek, MN), the Polish Independent Carpathian Brigade (SBSK) made a two-pronged
landing south and north of Nauplie (Nafplios). The landing south of Nauplie
went reasonably well and Polish troops moved toward Asini. The landing north
of Nauplie ran into extremely heavy fire. German and Italian artillery batteries
hammered landing crafts before they could reach the shore and 50mm AT-guns
wreaked havoc among the 7 Matilda-II tanks which were able to land. By 1030
Polish troopers were holding a slim territory ahead of the shore and were
constantly attacked by Italian and German troops. The 3 Hunt-class destroyers
delivered a considerable amount of fire support, which probably helped the
landing not to be repulsed immediately. However they were soon to have to
fight for themselves.
The Luftwaffe and the Regia Aeronautica reacted strongly, concentrating their
effort during the morning on the Argolykos Gulf. A first raid combining Ju-87
and Ju-88 under a strong Bf-109 and Macchi cover broke through the Allied
fighters top-cover. The Greek Destroyer Adrias was sunk by two bombs as well
as corvettes Apostolis and RN Delphinium. Minesweeper Seham was set ablaze
and two MGBs had to be beached.
On the highland road, the French attack toward Borsas and Fichti ran into
very strong German opposition. The 4km between Sterna and Maiantreni were
to take till 1400 and 23 SAV-41 of the De Larminat's Brigade were to be lost
(The French Tankers saying "It took us a tank for each metre we moved" when
they talk about the "road of blood" is an obvious overstatement, but the
memory of the fight on the highland road is still bitter). The 1st French
Infantry Division attack along the Xerias valley went more easily till Akova.
Then, attackers ran into what they described as a "solid wall of fire". No
less than 17 US M3 and 11 French M3F light tanks were lost in half an hour.
By 1330, the French 1st Infantry Division was to any effect stopped at Akova.
Along the coast, the British attack seemed to offer the best prospects.
By 1000 Timerlio was reached and stormed. The 7th Armoured division then
attacked toward Magoula and Kefalari. Magoula was taken by 1130, even if
German resistance was now very hot and British tanks entered Kefalari by
1300.
On the ground of relatively good news of the advance, but also of bad news
of one of the SBSK landing, Gen. Ritchie, to whom Gen. Juin had delegated
supervision of the British sector of attack, ordered the 50th and the 7th
Armoured to speed up on the coastal road toward Tiryntha. Clearly, Ritchie
was thinking that the two violent French attacks had attracted most of German
armoured forces. The fact that by 1400 British tanks had crossed the railway
line and were moving to meet the British infantry north of Timerlio looked
like a vindication of Ritchie's hope.
Early in the afternoon "Nestor" was looking reasonably good. Polish troops
were still suffering much north of Nauplie, but had succeeded reaching Lefkakia,
south. The French attack had resumed toward Borsas, even if the fighting was
extremely disputed. Only at Akova were French troops stopped. Gen. De Lattre
de Tassigny went personally on the front line by 1500 and, by 1630, French
infantry was entering Akova after hands-to-hands fighting against German
and Italian troops. By 1700, British troops moving along the coast were reaching
Tiryntha and were at less than 3 km from the Poles north beachhead. Luftwaffe
activity was still extremely high and allied fighters were hard pressed preventing
new attacks against ships in the Argolikos Gulf. Still, it was a reasonably
confident Ritchie who reported to Juin that Argos encirclement could probably
be achieved by the end of the next day. Actually, Juin had received from
de Larminat and Koenig information that French troops were reaching Borsas
but that fighting power of the two brigades would soon be exhausted. By late
evening, Juin asked Gen. Sudre (who was in command of the French 1st Armoured
division) to send the Langlade Brigade on the highland road, despite the
fact this unit had suffered much in previous fights.
He ordered too the de Hautecloque armoured Brigade, then supporting G.
Billotte's division, to move east "with the utmost speed".
Northern Greece and Aegean:
By 1020 Limnos was attacked by a force of 18 Ju-88 escorted by 24 Bf-109
form the IInd FK. The 8 standing patrol P-38 were unable to catch the raid
before the bombing, but destroyed 3 Ju-88 and 1 Bf-109 to the cost of two
of themselves.
The Italian Aegean Naval squadron moved under the Xth FK protection from
Salonika to Kavalla during the day.
At 1530, Mudros was raided by 12 III/JG 77 Bf-109 fighter-bombers, which
had refuelled at Alexandropoulis.
By 1300, R.Adm Vian's force left Mytilene escorting two Greek small freighters
with equipments and supplies for Allied troops in Limnos. The convoy reached
Mudros by 2330. However, just before entering the harbour, the convoy was
ambushed by Italian midget submarine, which sank one of the two freighters
and escaped Allied destroyers.
During the night, AT-11 floatplanes (Northrop N3M) dropped magnetic mines
out of Alexandropoulis and Kavalla.
Sumatra (NEI)
By 0530 V.Adm Nagumo's four carriers launched a major raid against Palembang.
The city and the airfield are hit at dawn and, despite a gallant opposition
delivered by RAF and RAAF hurricane (which were able to destroy 7 B3A1 and
6 A6M2 to the cost of 7 of their owns) both targets are heavily hit.
By 0850, Palembang is attacked by Kuching-based Ki-21 medium bombers. In
the same time the Dutch airfield in Manopati is raided by 21 Kuching-based
G4M1 escorted by 27 A6M2. This raid destroys the last ML-KNIL B-339 and CW-21B
fighters. At the same time news of Japanese landings in Sumatra at Telukbetang
through the Sunda Straits began to arrive to the Allied HQ.
By 0950 a combined formation of 54 Kawasaki Ki-56 and LO IJAAF transport
planes and of 33 IJNAF Nakajima L2D3 transports drop around 1100 IJA and IJN
airborne troops on the Palembang-II airfield.
Japanese airborne troops are quickly counter-attacked by British and Dutch
forces, and unable to keep the airfield. They are able however to control
Palembang refineries.
In the same time, covered by V. Adm Ozawa force, R. Adm Kubo 4th Surprise
attack force commanded by lands troops at Pangkapinank and at the mouth of
the Palembang Musi River.
MARCH 23rd:
Central Mediterranean:
Pantelleria airfield is cleared as a "refuelling stop" for fighters, but
still not as an operational base.
Peloponnesus:
The night had been a difficult one for Poles north of Nauplie, despite the
fact they could see British troops not far from them. French troops also
had a difficult night, trying to storm Borsas by "coup de main", to be repulsed
once just before mid-night and to succeed the second time at 0400. Operation
"Nestor" was to resume at 0730. However, by 0600 it was the German artillery,
which began to pound British forces, soon, relayed after dawn by Stuka and
fighter-bombers. As British forces were preparing to attack both eastward
toward Nauplie and northward to cut the Nauplie-Argos road and turn Argos
by east, hey were stuck by a German armoured push moving along the railway
line.
Kefalari fell by 1000 and German tanks cut the 7th Armoured division in
two between Magoula and Timerlio, despite desperate efforts from the 2nd
RTR and the 7th support group. In the fight around Magoula, Brig. Campbell
was seen firing a 2-pdr AT-gun with the help of his staff to try to stem
the German advance. Slightly east, north to Timerlio, the 3rd RHA Regiment
tried too desperately to stop advancing German and Italian tanks. The 3rh
RHA "J" battery was whipped out before noon, with Lt Ward Gunn receiving
a Victoria cross for keeping the last 2-pdr in his battery firing, along
with Major Pinney (Battery Commander) and Battery NC, Sergeant Grey, acting
as his loaders until he was killed. (After the war, "J" Battery, 3rd RHA
was officially renamed "Timerlio J Battery"). Tanks of the 15th Panzer reached
the coast south of Timerlio by 1430. The 8th Hussars were struck in the rear
and lost 35 tanks. In the afternoon, Brig Campbell tried to assemble a force
to keep the Magoula corridor open and to breakthrough to the sea so to relieve
the 50th and the 4th Indian Divisions. Each attempt was however foiled by
concentrated fire of German AT-guns and tanks. Many vicious fights developed
among orchards and between stoned walls. Firing from well-protected positions,
German 88mm guns were still levying a heavy toll. By the end of the day the
7th Armoured Brigade was down to 15 battle-worthy tanks, the 22nd Armoured
Brigade was down to 30 cruiser tanks and the Support Group was virtually
non existent. But for Brig. Campbell who spent the end of the afternoon and
the evening rallying troops and vehicles, the 7th Armoured Division could
have ceased to exist.
In the meantime, the 15th panzer was still advancing south and has taken
Myloi and Kiveri on the coast before dusk. British troops on the coastal road
between Timerlios and Tiryntha were completely trapped. On the road to Fichti,
French troops were expected to resume their attack by 0900. Anti-tank fire,
out of Borsas made further advance impossible in the light of the state of
exhaustion reached by troops. By 1230 another threat appeared as elements
of the 21st Panzer attacked from Koutsopodi toward Maiantreni and Sterna.
This attack was checked in the afternoon by ad-hoc groupings mixing SAV-AU-41
tank-hunters and M3F light tanks. No less than 37 Pz-III and Pz-IV were destroyed
south of Sterna as well as part of the 21st Panzer support infantry. This
success however played in German hands to some sense. The 1st French Armoured
Division, Gen. Sudre, signalled to Gen. Juin that his forces had repulsed
"German probing attacks". By 1900, fearing that the next day would see a "major"
attack against Sterna cutting off advanced French forces, and in the light
of the disaster on the coastal road, Juin ordered French armoured Brigades
to retire toward Sterna and Lyrkeia. During the night, Gen. de Lattre de
Tassigny begged authorization to attack toward Argos, feeling able to disrupt
the German forces around Argos making then mandatory for them to recall armoured
elements pushing south. It is doubtful however, in the light of heavy losses
suffered so far, the French 1st Infantry Division could have break through
German and Italian defensive positions west of Argos. De Lattre never got
the authorization he had asked for and received the order to dig-in.
For both Juin and Ritchie the situation on the coastal road looked really
critical. The mauling the 7th Armoured Division had suffered would prevent
it to attack from West. Without support, the 50th Infantry division could
not be expected to break the encirclement. Only naval evacuation could save
troops here engaged, but probably to the cost of much of their heavy equipments.
Naval support was essential, but with the situation in Northern Aegean, only
the "Perzo division" (less the minelayer Welshman) would be available immediately.
The three French Contre-Torpilleurs were then asked to provide fire-support
on the Argolykos Gulf Western shore, till landing crafts could evacuate British
troopers. Gen. Juin requested that the French destroyer squadron which had
operated in support of "Jaguar" and was now in Sfax (MN L'Alcyon, La Palme,
Le Mars, Ouragan, Simoun, Tramontane and Typhon) could be sent to boost naval
forces supporting the Peloponnesus operation immediately. Authorization was
granted quickly, but that would mean that ships would not be available at
best before March 25 at dawn.
Northern Greece and Aegean:
Still under the cover of the Xth FK, Italian ships moved from Kavalla to
Alexandropoulis. At 0850 Torpedo-boat Lupo detonated a magnetic mine off
Kavalla harbour and sank quickly.
At 1200 a German raid hit Limnos, targeting the airfield where two French
DC-3 are destroyed on the ground. Without radar warning, the Standing Patrol
misses the raid through clouds.
By 1610 8 III/JG-77 fighter-bombers attack Mudros harbour, sinking the
second Greek freighter, but hopefully after she had unloaded her freight.
The low-flying planes are however caught-up by 4 of the 8 "standing patrol"
P-38 and they loss 3 of them before destroying 2 P-38 in return.
With dusk, 9 French DC-3 land on the damaged runway, to unload AA ammunitions
and take wounded.
Sumatra (NEI)
Japanese airborne troops have been cornered around the refineries during
the night. However, news of Japanese troops arriving to Palembang through
the Musi River lead to some panic and Allied troops retire from Palembang
by 1200. Japanese troops are in control of Palembang by the night. When this
is known, the resistance on Sumatra south-east part which so far had been
good, collapse, as Allied troops try to escape toward the western coast.
In the same time, Nagumo's carrier deliver a heavy raid against Sabang
which, despite a very strong AA defence which shot down 3 dive-bombers, one
level bomber and two fighters destroy 9 Hurricane on the ground, 3 in the
air and 7 Manchester on the ground. Refuelling equipment is heavily hit during
the raid. Local air defence has been surprised as Japanese planes have been
masked by Sumatra Mountains for much of their flight and detected by the
local radar only when at 20nm from their target.
A second raid is delivered by 1450 and this time met by a 6 Hurricane standing
patrol. Allied fighters are able to destroy 2 D3A1 and 2 A6M2 but they lose
three planes, a fourth being severely damaged.
Karimata Straits and Java Sea
Operating now from Port-Blair HMS Unique (Ln. A.F. Collett) approaches the
mouth of the Musi River and sank one Japanese freighter and sub-chaser CH-10.
Papua Eastern Coast:
Japanese forces from Rabaul land at Lae and Salamaua in the Huon Gulf. Adm.
W. Brown, who has left Noumea the day before with CV Wasp and Lexington to
cover a large convoy decides, with Adm. King's agreement, to turn back toward
Papua so to "Attack Enemy". The two carriers are soon joined by F. Fletcher's
own, USS Yorktown.
MARCH 24th:
Peloponnesus:
By 0330 French Contre-Torpilleurs Le Fantasque (F), L'Indomptable and Le
Terrible entered the Argolykos Gulf and, by 0400 they began to pound German
elements in Kiveri. By 0600 the evacuation of British troops began as Allied
planes bombed and attacked German and Italian positions in the plain south
of Argos and tried to provide cover against the Luftwaffe.
Air fights over the Argolykos Gulf were heavy during the whole day as German
and Italian fighters not only tried to escort their own bombers but also went
for Allied ones. Ju-88 sank the RN Hunt-class destroyer Middleton in the
morning, and then minesweepers HMS Rye and Hythe in the afternoon as well
as two MN manned PC boats. One British Brigade and some Polish troops were
evacuated but the job was far to be down by dusk and went on during all the
night. Engaging German and Italian artillery batteries shelling the beach,
the Greek destroyer Krite was hit twice by 150mm shells and had her aft 4in
twin mount destroyed. Two more PC-boats (one Greek manned and the second
belonging to the MN) were heavily damaged by artillery fire when closing the
beach north to Nauplie to help evacuating Polish troops.
The Aegean Air forces lost 17 fighters and fighter-bombers as well as 11
light bombers during the day against 9 German bombers, 5 German and 6 Italian
fighters.
In the same time, the 15th Panzer was still moving south, despite air attacks
by French close-support aircrafts and some naval bombardment. By the end
of the day, German tanks had reached Astros and Andritsa (by moving along
the railway line). The threat of an attack from east toward Tripolis was
real and by early afternoon, Gen. Juin ordered the 1st French Infantry division
to move out of the Xerias Valley and the 1st French Armoured Division to
fall back to Tripolis. Elements of the 9th Colonial Infantry Division were
to take position east of Tripolis, helped by the de Hautecloque Brigade once
it will have arrived, to block any German push coming from Andritsa.
North Greece and Aegean.
Limnos is raided twice by KG-77 bombers during the day, the first raid being
missed by the P-38 standing patrol, but the second one (12 bombers escorted
by 16 fighters) is intercepted after visual alert from the ground. 3 Ju-88
and 2 Bf-109 are lost in the fight for 3 P-38 (two being downed and a third
crash-landing near Mudros). Through hasty repairs, the runway is now in a
slightly better shape and no less than 33 French DC-3 land during the day
to bring supplies and take-out wounded. By the end of the day the SAAF n°1
SQN and RAF n°605 SQN are declared operational from Lesbos-Mytilene 2
(a secondary airfield actually on Lesbos northern coast).
During the night, RAF Stirling based in Rhodes attack Alexandroupolis harbour.
Indian Ocean
By dawn, 36 D3A1 escorted by 27 A6M2 coming from Nagumo's carriers attack
Port-Blair in the Andamans. They are intercepted by 6 Vickers type 355 of
which 5 are destroyed in the ensuing fight against 3 A6M2. The French seaplane-tender
Commandant-Teste is seriously damaged and has to be beached. Two medium-sized
freighters are destroyed in the harbour.
Sumatra (NEI)
Japanese troops began to push north, toward Medan, from Palembang