June 21 -25, 1942: Allies
launch "Pericles" in the Peloponesseus.
Axis counterattacks lead to fierce and bitter fighting.
The USSR makes deeper contact with the Allies.
SECOND ROUND IN PELOPONNESUS:
OPERATION "PERICLES".
Decided jointly by the French and the British MTO General Staffs, this
operation was aimed at (i) freeing the "Pyrgos pocket" and then easing the
situation of the French 2nd Army Corps and (ii) enlarging the "Tripolis
Bulge" so to prevent Axis armoured forces from launching a new attempt to
encircle Tripolis. "Pericles" was basically an attempt to put the situation
back where it started before the Rommel's counter-offensive of late March
and early April.
By June 21st, the front line was running, from east to west, from
the Argolykos Gulf coast at Par Tyrou and Voskina and the southern slopes
of the Mavrila Mount (4,000ft) and then north toward Tripolis. The British
XXXth Corps was holding this part of the front up to Agios Petros, where
it connected with the French Ist Army Corps. The 1st South African Division
(Maj.Gen. Brink) with 4th, 5th and 6th SA Brigades was holding the coast and
Mavrila Mount slopes, with the 4th Indian Infantry Division deployed from
Agios Vasileios to Kastanitsa. Both units were supported by the 32nd British
Army Tank Brigade with a mix of Matilda-II and Valentine VI and but also
the brand new Churchill (Infantry Tank Mk. IV) Test Squadron (CTS), with
five troops of 3 tank each with 2 of Churchill-I, 2 of Churchill-II one of
Churchill-III and a HQ troop of 3 M3 Grant.
The 7th British Armoured Division with 4th Armoured Brigade, 7th Armoured
Brigade, 22nd Armoured Brigade, 2nd Rifle Brigade, 1st Kings Royal Rifle
Corp, 3rd and 4th RHA, 60th Field Rgmt RA, was deployed from Kastanitsa
to Agios Petros. This unit had suffered much, first during the unsuccessful
attack on Argos and then during the German counter-attack, but had been refitted
with Crusader and US M3-Grant tanks as well as with the M3 "Honey" light
tank. The 7th Armoured Brigade had received two experimental troops of the
Gun Carrier 3-inch Churchill Mk. I. This vehicle had been developed from
September 1941 when the General Staff asked the Tank Board to investigate
the possibility of producing both cruiser and infantry tanks armed with a
high velocity gun. This request was a result of the poor showing of British
tanks against German Panzers during the Campaign of Greece in May and June
1941.
Neither the new Infantry Tank Mk. IV nor the Valentine could mount a
gun bigger than the 6pdr. It was however suggested that the 3-in (21 cwt.)
AA gun could be fitted to the Churchill in a limited traverse mount, as large
stocks of this gun existed with its replacement by the 3.7-in gun as the
Army's standard heavy AA weapon. Vauxhall Motors were asked to give priority
to this project and the pilot model wasready for firing trials at Larkhill
by February 1942. Test proved satisfactory, but the whole project nearly
foundered because inter-departmental bickering between the Royal Artillery
Corps and the Tank Corps. There was an argument that, because it lacked
a turret this vehicle was self-propelled artillery. But the RAC had no requirement
for such a vehicle, and most (very conservative) RAC senior officers were
seeing it as a waste of rseources. The RTC argued that it was a special
tank, but then asked for a lot of modifications, which could have crippled
the programme. What saved it actually were reports from the French successful
use of a nearly similar vehicle (the SAV-AU 41) and Brigadier Jock Campbell
strong support. An order for 100 vehicles was finally given to Beyer Peacock
Ltd and the first 6 hurriedly ferried to MTO and Peloponnesus.
From Agios Petros, the front was moving north toward Agiorgitika. This
was the "Eastern Tripolis" sector of the French 1st Army Corps (Ltn. Gen.
Du Vigier). The 2nd Moroccan Infantry division (Gen. De Hesdin) was holding
from Oria to Aggios Sofia and the 9th Colonial Infantry Division (Gen. Morlière)
was holding from Aggios Sofia to north of Agiorgitika, which was in the
hand of the 4th RTT after days of bloody fighting. Both unit, in addition
to their divisional armoured units were supported by the US Army 13th Armoured
regiment (1st US Armoured Division). This unit, Commanded by Col. Paul Robinett,
was actually non-standard with 1 medium tank battalion and 1 light tank
battalion (Col. Todd), with 57 M3(medium) and 75 M3(light). The 1st French
Armoured Division (Gen. Sudre) was holding the sector covering the northern
part of the Tripolis Bulge, from Agiorgitika to Skopi and then west to Silimna.
The western part of the "Bulge", going to Megatopoli was in the capable
hands of the 10th French Mountain Infantry Division (also called "Division
Alpine"), the 4th Moroccan Mountain Infantry Division (DIMM) commanded by
Gen. Sevez and the 4th RSM (4ème Régiment de Spahis Marocain),
a light cavalry unit commanded by Col. Navarre. The 1st French Army Corps
was supported by the 11th BACA (Brigade d'Artillerie de Corps d'Armée
or Army Corps Artillerie Brigade) with 8,400 men, COs and NCOs and 24 x
155mm guns (155/40 GPF), 54 x 155mm howitzers, 108 x 105mm howitzers, 54
x 120mm mortars, one indep. AOP Cy with 12 Stinson planes and the 121st
RAL (Regiment d'Artillerie Lourde or Heavy Artillery Rgmt), with 1650 men,
Co and NCo and 18 x 155/40mm GPF guns, 36 x 203mm howitzers.
Megatopoli marked the border between the 1st French and the 2nd French
Army corps (Ltn. Gen. Bethouart), this last being split between troops holding
the line going from Megatopoli to Kalo Nero on the Peloponnesus western
coast, and troops defending the so-called Pyrgos pocket.
The Megatopoli-Kalo Nero sector was held by the 1st Yugoslav Infantry
Division, the 3rd Greek Mountain Infantry Brigade and the 3rd Foreign Legion
Mobile Brigade of Gen. Koenig. The "Pyrgos Pocket", which had been constantly
reinforced since early April was held by the 10th French Infantry Division
(Gen. Billote), the 5th RTM (Moroccan Riflemen Regiment, (actually a unit
belonging to the 4th DIMM), the 1st Moroccan Tabor Group (1er Groupement
des Tabors Marocain) commanded by Gen. Guillaume and the 3rd Moroccan Tabor
Group (3ème Groupement de Tabors Marocains) commanded by Col. Hogard.
Axis forces facing the "Armée d'Orient" were under command of
Gen. Oberst Erwin Rommel and included 3 Army Corps. The first one was the
Italian Gruppo Armata Pafundi (Ltn. Gen Pafundi) with the 131st Divizione
Corazzata "Centauro", (Gen. Gavino Pizzolato), the 1st Divisione Celere
(motorized) "Eugenio di Savoia" commanded by Gen. Cesare Lomaglio, the 7th
Lanciere di Milano Cav. Rgmt (Based at Agrinion) and the 14th Infantry Division
"Isonzo", Gen. Federico Romero. (based in Athens and Corynth). These units
were tasked with holding the line from the Argolykos Gulf up to Agiorgitika.
The second Axis Army Corps was the now called "PanzerGruppe Leonidas" (Ltn.
Gen. Cruewell) and included the 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions as well as
elements of the 22nd Air-Landing Division (Gen. Ludwig Wolff), which have
not been destroyed at Limnos. This Army Group was concentrated around the
Eastern and Northern flanks of the Tripolis Bulge. Western Peloponnesus
was under the responsibility of the "ArmeeGruppe Skandenberg" (Ltn.Gen.
Dietl, who had just arrived in Greece from Norway on June 17th) and included
the 1st and 3rd German Mountain Divisions (Gebirgsjager Division), the
4th Italian « Cuneense » Mountain Infantry ("Alpini") Division
and the 53rd Infantry Division "Arezzo" commanded by Gen. Ernesto Ferone.
The two Italian units were facing the French 10th DI around Pyrgos as the
two German Mountain infantry divisions were extended from the west coast
up to Megatopoli.
Both sides have suffered grievious losses during the "Crusader" operation
and the German counter-attack. Generally speaking, Axis forces have been
much less resplenished and reinforced than Allied forces. Constraints from
Barbarossa were being felt. Still, Rommel had been able to obtain some tanks
(including 17 brand new Pz-V with the short 75mm gun) and the two Panzer
Divisions could field a total of 265 tanks. The situation was not as good
for Italian forces, which were all seriously understrength. The Army Group
Pafundi could field a total of 117 M13/40 and M14/41 tanks, supported by
41 Tankettes and 21 M41 75/18 SP guns. Axis forces could field as a whole
508 tracked armoured vehicles for the whole Peloponnesus. This was just a
fraction of the Allied tanks deployed in Peloponnesus. The two French Army
Corps benefited from 1376 armoured vehicles (416 SAV-41, SAV-42 and M3 medium
tanks; 833 light tanks of which 442 were Valentine VI; and 127 self-Propelled
SAV-AU-41 assault guns). The British XXXth Corps was fielding 510 tanks of
which 320 were medium (Crusader, Grant and Matilda-II) and 190 light (of
which 96 M3 Honey and 82 Valentine). The balance of tank forces was then
of 3.7/1 favouring the Allies.
The Armée d'Orient also had a clear numerical edge, and could
rely on powerful naval fire support when needed.
In such a situation, the plan Giraud and Ritchie drafted could be seen
as conservative. It asked for the XXXth and part of the French 1st Corps
to fix the enemy on Eastern Peloponnesus while a combined attack from the
Megatopoli area (French 1st Corps) and the Pyrgos pocket (French 2nd Corps)
was intended to encircle and destroy the Germano-Italian Skandenberg Corps.
In a second stage, combined with an amphibious landing on Zante (operation
Ajax), the Allies were hoping to attack from Agiorgitika toward the Argolykos
Gulf to destroy the Pafundi Army Corps.
One reason of the relative Allied caution was the unexpected success
of Rommel's counter-offensive late March. Another reason was that the Peloponnesus
was no longer the central focus of Allied efforts in the Mediterranean. Significant
forces were to be saved to prepare "Torch", the major late summer operation
against Sicily. Operation "Pericles" was however needed to restore a more
continuous front between Western and Eastern Peloponnesus, and also to attract
to Greece as many Italian and German troops as possible. Hence the name
of "Pericles", which was hoped would cause the enemy to believe that Athens
was the true aim of this major operation.
Both sides expected the other to attack or to react violently. Giraud
and Ritchie were mostly concerned by a possible German attack against the
XXXth Corps and French 1st Corps border at Agiorgitika. They expected Rommel
to try to drive a wedge between the two corps, and to push toward the Tripolis-Sparti
road to encircle the Tripolis Bulge. On the other hand, Rommel was expecting
an Allied push toward the Argolykos Gulf, probably combined with another
amphibious operation, to destroy the Pafundi Italian Army Corps and then land
forces in the south at Nauplie and move toward Corynth. Letters Rommel wrote
to his wife at this time show he was deeply concerned by the Allied naval
superiority and the threat of being outflanked from the Sea.
The Axis situation was actually more difficult than the Allied. The
Italian command was worrying about a possible Allied landing in Italy, but
opinions diverged on where it would most likely happen. Gen. Pafundi and
Marshal Badoglio thought that by Fall 1942, once the build up of US forces
in North Africa had progressed, Allied troops would land in Sicily. They
tried to persuade Mussolini and the German Staff of this view, and argued
for abandonning Peloponnesus but for a beachhead around Corynth. Defence
of mainland Greece would then be much easier, and the troops saved then
could be redeployed in Sicily. However, both the OKW and German commanders
in Greece, that is Rommel and Kesselring, held a different opinion. They
thought of Allied presence in Peloponnesus as the first step before a landing
in the toe of the Italian boot, somewhere between Otranto and Tarento. Still,
the OKW plainly appreciated the fact that no significant reserves could be
allocated to Greece and pressured Rommel to adopt a clearly defensive stance.
But Rommel knew better.
By early June, he had paid a visit to Mussolini in Rome to try to convince
the Italian dictator. He explained that a mountainous island like Sicily
could be easily defended but that a landing between Bari and Otranto would
allow enemy mechanized units to move north quite easily, to control the Foggia
plain and from there to dominate the whole south of Italy. Such a landing
would however necessitate control of the Peloponnesus, and to abandon this
part of Greece without a fight would equal handling the enemy an important
strategic advantage. On the other hand, Rommel was quite sure that if given
enough assets he could destroy the enemy in Peloponnesus and force the Allies
to withdraw back to Crete. Rommel's argument was clear: defence of Italy
was predicated on Peloponnesus control. To what extent he was himself convinced
is difficult to say. His personal papers show he harboured no doubts about
the fact that the Allied logistic tide would become more and more difficult
to stem with time. Maybe he believed that a quick victory in Peloponnesus
could force the Allies to change their plans. In the end it seems clear
that he won the day against Badoglio and got some backing from Mussolini.
The Italian government abandoned any plan to evacuate Peloponnesus, and what
meagre reserves existed were sent to Greece.
Here, however, logistics in their way made defence of northern Peloponnesus
mandatory. The only railway line going from the Italian border with Yugoslavia
to Athens was extremely vulnerable to Allied bombings, and generally speaking
the Greek and Yugoslav railways network was underdeveloped and ill suited
to support large forces. Ship transit through the Corinth Canal to Piraeus
was still the most effective supply line, but that made the defence of
Peloponnesus mandatory. Hence, at the same time Giraud and Ritchie were
planning for a fresh new round, Rommel was feverishly preparing a new offensive
to try to destroy Allied forces around Tripolis.
========
Allied Naval Force on the eve of "Periclès" and "Ajax". A - Eastern Med. Fleet:
CinC
Adm. Cunningham
I - Strike force: (Adm. Rawlings)
BB: HMS Queen Elizabeth, Warspite, MN Lorraine, Provence
CV
HMS Furious (with 10 Fulmar IIs of the 809 SQN, 10 Fulmar-II of the 807
SQN and 6 Swordfish for ASW patrol or 20 Fulmar-II and 6 Swordfish).
USN Ranger (Rear Adm. E.D. McWhorter, with VF-9 with 24 F4F-3 (Lt.Cdr
John Raby), VF-41 21 F4F-3 (Lt.Cdr C.T. Booth II), VS-41 15 SBD-3 (Lt. Cdr.
L.P. Carver): total 45 F4F-3/4, 15 SBD-3)
Screen: Vice-Admiral A. T. Curteis
CA HMS Exeter, MN Dupleix, USN Augusta
CL HMS Kenya (Flag), MN Gloire, USN Brooklyn
CLAA Sirius
Large DD: Volta, Cassard, Kersaint, Tartu,
DD: HMS Nizam, HMAS Norman, MN L'Alcyon, La Palme, Yugoslav: Ljubljana
and Zagreb, USN DD Wainwright, Mayrant, Trippe, Rhind, Wilkes, Swanson,
Ludlow, Ericson.
II - Close escort group
DE (Hunt class) Middleton and Krite** (Greek), MN (old US Wilkes class/
DE conversion) Le Corse, Le Breton, Le Picard, Le Gascon
"Flower" class corvettes: Pindos** (Greek), MN Yser, Oise, Ill and Moselle
MS MN, Sans Reproche, Sans Pareil, Sans Peur (USN Raven "220ft" type,
doubling as PCE).
Inshore Group
MS HMS Boston, Seham, Hebe, Speedy, Rye, Hythe.
6 Inshore minesweepers (255t Admiralty Type) manned by MN as:DM 360, 361,
362, 363, 364, 365.
16 PC boats (US built, light ASW) of which 8 manned by MN (L'Eveillé,
Le Rusé, L'Enjoué, Le Résolu, L'Emporté, L'Effronté,
L'Ardent, L'indiscret), 3 by Greek crews and 5 by Yugoslav crews.
(12) MGB’s (Greek, RN, MN)
(12) MTB's (Greek, RN, MN, RYN)
Heavy Fire Support Squadron: HMS Erebus, Terror
1st Inshore Fire Support Squadron (or light monitor squadron)
IFSS-G: MN M100, M101, Greek Navy M102, 103, 104, Yugoslav M 105.
IFSS-F: MN M120, Greek M122
MN manned LCI(L)-F 2, 5, 6, 11 and Greek manned: LCI(L)-F 8, 12
2nd Inshore Fire-Support Squadron:
IFSS-G: HMS M106, 107, MN M109, Yugoslav M 108.
IFSS-F: HMS M123, MN M121
RN manned: LCI(L)-F 1, 3, 4, 7, 9, 10
(The LCI(L)-F is a variant of the LCI(L) specially developed to provide
AA defence and short range fire-support and armed with 3 twin 40mm Bofors
and 8 x 20mm Oerlikon.)
B - Aegean Squadron (R. Adm. P. Vian / Under Cunningham command):
CLAA HMS Dido (Flag), Hermyone, CL HMS Aurora and DD HMS Partridge, Maori,
and Somali.
Fast attack Division: C.V Perzo (Second in command): Large DD MN Le Fantasque
(F), L'Indomptable, Le Terrible, Guepard
Light forces Division: TB MN L'Incomprise, La Poursuivante, Branlebas,
(Hunt-II class) La Combattante, La Flore, La Pomone.
6 MGB's, 8 MTB's
Amphibious Division :
fast minelayer HMS Welshman , LSI (S) Prince Albert , Prince Beaudouin.
3 LCT (RN type carrying 6 20 tonnes tank each)
8 LCM, 4 LCI (L), 24 LCA, 15 LCP
C -Western Med. Fleet (V.ADM Gensoul)
BB: Richelieu (Flag),
CA Colbert, Tourville, Algérie
CLAA La Marseillaise
Large DD: Vauquelin, Simoun, Tramontane, Typhon, Le Mars, Ouragan..
DD Cyclone, Mameluck, Scirocco, Bison, Brestoix
============ JUNE 21st:
Paris:
Two bombs explode in trendy restaurants near the "Bois de Boulogne"
among German officers and French pro-German activists. 15 killed, 33 wounded.
North Africa:
To prevent any Italian interference with operation "Pericles" Allied
planes attack all day, hitting targets in Sicily and Southern Italy. 432
combat missions are flown and Messine, Syracuse and Tarento are attacked.
19 Allied planes are lost, of which 7 to AA fire, against 14 Italian fighters.
Peloponnesus:
Allied artillery pounded enemy positions from 0045 onwards in the "Pyrgos
Pocket", the Yugoslav 1st Infantry Division sector, as well as around Megatopoli,
where most of French Corps level artillery has been deployed, and around
Agiorgitika on the Tripolis Bulge eastern flank. By 0145, the 1st IFSS joined
the fray firing from off Zaharo onto positions held by the German 1st and
the Italian 4th mountain divisions. Attack began by 0350.
In the Yugoslav 1st Infantry Division it was mostly probing attacks
intended to fix the enemy. However, Yugoslav soldiers attacked with such
a ferocity that by 0545 Gen. Dietl warned Rommel and Kesselring of a possible
"massive enemy attack in the south sector". In Agiorgitika sector also the
attacks were mostly a diversion. The two main pushes were in the Megatopoli
and the Zaharo sectors.
In Megatopoli, the attack was launched by the 4th DIMM (less the 5th
RTM) and two "Chasseurs Alpins" regiments of the French 10th Mountain Division,
helped by tanks of the 3rd BMLE, where and when the situation allowed their
use. In the Zaharo sector, the attack included one Brigade of the French
10th Infantry Division on the north flank, and the 1st and 3rd Tabor Groups
and the 5th RTM.
The attack in Megatopoli is delayed by 30 minutes. It ran against positions
held by the 3rd German Mountain divisions and progresses were initially
slow. The attack on the Zaharo sector is a costly failure as the shelling,
be it from Army or naval guns, has been unable to effectively soften enemy
positions. By 1045 both Gens. Billote and Guillaume decide to suspend the
attack to try again the next night. However, by this time, the 4th DIMM is
making its way, at a high price, toward Kariteria.
The Aegean Air Force had launched from 0530 onwards three waves of light
and medium bombers against Axis airfields in the Athens region and the Luftwaffe
was busy defending its bases, even if 37 allied planes were lost (26 bombers
and 11 fighters) against 15 German. By 0945, Allied ground attack planes
(mostly P-39Ds belonging to GCCS I/22, II/22 and Yugoslav GC I/80 and II/80
(Y) as well as Vultee Vengeance of the GCCS IV/22 were pounding German positions
helped by Hawk-87. German planes didn't appear over the battle line before
mid afternoon, when 14 Ju-87 escorted by Bf-109F attacked Megatopoli.
By the end of the day, Gen. Giraud and Ritchie were relatively pleased
by "Pericles" beginning. They had expected a fierce resistance from German
mountain troops, but as the 4th DIMM was advancing toward Kariteria it seemed
that the first defence line had been pierced. The situation was not so good
in the Pyrgos pocket where the second push, intended to begin a pincer movement
against enemy forces in Western Peloponnesus, had failed. Giraud then requested
at 1815 from Adm. Cunningham "full naval support" in the Zaharo sector.
By 1950 Adm. Rawlings' forces were beginning to move toward the Western coast,
to provide full heavy gun support at night, doubled by air strikes at dawn.
In Athens, Rommel and Kesselring were also conferring. They then had
identified the Megatopoli-Kariteria-Andritsena direction as the main Allied
effort and clearly acknowledged attacks coming from the Yugoslav 1st Infantry
Division as a diversion, but were still thinking that attacks in the Pyrgos
pocket sector were not serious and a kind of diversion too. By 2230 Rommel
decided to launch his planned offensive against Tripolis on Tuesday 23rd,
once Allied forces were completely committed to their attack in Western
Peloponnesus.
Nouméa:
After the sunday morning mass, Rear Adm. Thierry d'Argenlieu meets Adm.
Ghormley to inform him of French reinforcements going to the South Pacific.
JUNE 22nd:
Washington:
US Navy CNO, Adm. King delivers to President F.D. Roosevelt a note on
USN deployments in months to come. Considering the now well established
Anglo-French naval supremacy in Mediterranean and the fact German BB Tirpitz
seems to be needed in Baltic sea for a while, he advocates concentrating
most of USN BBs in the Pacific, but for those sunk in Pearl Harbor or undergoing
repairs and reconstructions after damage.
He proposes then: "Of our two older 14-in armed battleships, BB34 New
York and BB35 Texas are in the Atlantic fleet for convoy duties. Their old
machinery doesn't allow for more than 16kts. They could be more profitably
be used as fire support ships in the Mediterranean once most of the 7th Army
has been carried to North Africa, that is by early August.
BB36 Arkansas, actually a 12-in parallel design to the Texas class,
is also deployed in the Atlantic Fleet for troop escort duties. As her 12-in
guns are less powerful, we suggest to use her for escort without further
modernisation.
Of the next oldest, the Nevada class, BB36 Nevada is under repair until
probably spring 1943 and BB37 Oklahoma has been sunk in Pearl Harbour.
She is severely damaged and once raised she is to be scrapped. Of the Pennsylvania
class, BB39 Arizona has been completely destroyed during the Pearl Harbor
raid. BB38 Pennsylvania has actually been much less damaged than her sister
and has been repaired. She is now operating off US West coast but is to
need by next fall a complete refit and possibly conversion to more modern
standards.
BB40 New Mexico has been operating since early 1942 in the Pacific and
BB41 Mississippi now operating as convoy escort in the Atlantic could be
moved to the Pacific Fleet by July. She would replace BB42 Idaho, which is
intended to enter a refit and modernization cycle by next October.
BB 43 Tennessee, slightly damaged at Pearl Harbor, is now operating
off the US West coast, but she is also to be refitted and BB44 California
– salvaged after the Pearl Harbor attack, is now under repair until Jan 44
BB45 Colorado and BB46 Maryland are now operating off the West Coast,
but Maryland wil need a complete refit by the end of the year. Their sister,
BB48 West Virginia, has been sunk at Pearl Harbor and is under repair until
at least late spring 1944."
Of modern US Battleships, BB55 North Carolina and BB56 Washington are
operational, and King proposes to send them immediately to the Pacific Fleet
as well as the brand new BB57 South Dakota. The two others BB58 Indiana
and BB59 Massachusetts are to complete their training and working up cycle
and are not to be ready before fall 1942.
King's note stresses then the fact that both the IJN and the RN are
operating with capital ships twinned with aircraft carriers. He advocates
then splitting the Pacific Fleet Battleforce in two squadrons, one concentrating
older ships (Pennsylvania, New Mexico, Mississippi, Idaho and Tennessee)
and operating from US West Coast and the other concentrating all new US
battleships (North Carolina, Washington, South Dakota) as well as the two
16-in armed older ones, which have not been severely damaged in Pearl Harbor
(Colorado and Maryland) either in Pearl Harbor or in South Pacific where
operation "Watchover" is probably to induce a violent Japanese reaction.
He stresses too the fact that fuel reserves built up by the NEI government
late 1941 and early 1942 are enabling significant naval forces to operate
in South Pacific. Ships allocated to the West Coast squadron were to be progressively
sent to refit, when newer Battleships were to become operational.
King adds then: "Both Colorado and Maryland, if powerful, are unfortunately
too slow to effectively combine with our new Task-Forces. They could however
provide valuable support at least until the end of the year when both will
be badly in need of a thorough refit and modernization. I would suggest
we open talks with the French Navy about the two fast light Battleships (Dunkerque
and Strasbourg) sent to US shipyards for overhaul and modernization. I know
that Adm. Lemonnier is aware of the potential value of both ships in the
Pacific. Would the French Government agree to have them operating with our
fleet in South Pacific, they could form a fast wing and operate with our
heavy cruisers in the van of our Battleship force. Alternatively, they could
provide protection against any kind of Japanese built fast armoured raider.
They would then be very useful until the first two of our CB1 class large
cruisers laid down last February would be ready. I would add that we could
gain operational experience with such ships, a type which our Navy has never
operated, and this could lead to important feedback during CB1 class ships'
construction. If an agreement could be reached on this point with the French
Government, I would then suggest that Dunkerque and Strasbourg are to join
as soon as possible our South Pacific Fleet. Colorado and Maryland are to
be used until then to support our forthcoming amphibious operation. Once
Indiana and Massachusetts are ready, Colorado and Maryland will be sent
back to the West Coast squadron because of their low speed. This would allow
for Maryland's refit cycle to begin no later than next December. Colorado
could operate till mid-1943, then freeing two 14-in armed ships to be sent
to the Atlantic Fleet once they are refitted. Pennsylvania and Tennessee
would be probably the first two to exit their refit cycle by spring 1943 and
are then to be sent to the Atlantic Fleet.
Logic would call for slow but heavily armed battleships to be used
in a restricted Theatre of Operations like the Mediterranean and fast ones
to be used in open seas with our aircraft-carrier forces. We can expect to
have by late 1942 a six Battleships (all 16-in armed) squadron operating
in South or Central Pacific helped by a covering force made of two very
fast 13-in armed Battleships and of heavy cruisers, and a four slow Battleships
squadron (with one 16-in armed and the others 14-in armed) to cover the
US West coast. We would then have 3 older Battleships operating in the Atlantic
Fleet, with two detached in the Mediterranean and one co-operating with
the RN "R" class for convoy escort."
On the topic of new construction he points to:"...the fact that the
IJN has lost so far 1 BC and 2 BB is to be plainly taken into account.
With only 3 Kongoes left, I would advise cancellation of the two BB 61 ships
that have been ordered through the July 19th, 1940 Naval Act (BB 65 and
BB 66). The four BB 61 ships actually building are more than enough to cope
with IJN fast battleships. I would suggest you reconsider your decision of
last April to suspend BB67 class ships ordered under the July 1940 Act. If
BB65 and BB66 are cancelled, enough materials could be saved to push ahead
at least BB67 and BB68 as well as to allocate funds for the new Panama Canal
locks needed for these very large ships. We know that the Japanese have
completed two very large battleships of over 45,000t and armed with 16-in/50
guns. One foreign Intelligence source, which has so far proved to be reliable,
is claiming they actually are armed with 18-in guns. Whatever the truth,
the US Navy needs at least two BB67 class Battleships".
Peloponnesus:
In the Pyrgos Pocket sector, the four Battleships under Adm. Rawlings
command began shelling enemy positions by 0215, joined by small monitors
of the 1st IFSS. By 0410, as the naval bombardment barrage was shifting
to deeper targets, the attack resumed, led first by the 5th RTM. If the
previous dawn attacks have been bloody and bitter, those happening between
the initial attack and noon this day were never to be surpassed during the
whole Peloponnesus campaign for their ferocity. Coming after losses suffered
during the previous days attack, Moroccan soldiers determination was still
high and they were highly motivated by revenge and by leading examples of
French officers whose loses were to be unsurpassed (11% of KIA and 22% of
WIA for the whole "Pericles" operation in the 2nd Army Corps against a combined
total of 25% losses for private and NCos). In the 5th RTM sector a now-famous
incident took place during this night. Moroccan riflemen, seeing their commanding
officer, Captain Henry de Belsunce, killed by machine gun fire, took his
body with them carrying it seated on a rifle through the whole of their
successful attack. At the end they seated the corpse in front of killed
German and Italian defenders they had lined up in a small field.
Orders were shouted sometimes in French but mostly Arab and Berbere
languages. On the radio network, Gen. Guillaume (call-sign "Auroch") then
launched his Tabors in Arabic dialect ("Zidou l'gouddam" / Move Forward).
Weakened by a naval bombardment, which had been much more effective
than the previous one and harassed by USN dive-bombers and bomb armed Wildcats,
Axis troops lost their first defence lines. By noon French troops had inserted
a wedge between the German 1st and the Italian 4th Mountain divisions. The
3rd Tabor Group (Col. Hogard) began to move inside the gap then opened.
By 1530 Moroccan soldiers entered Platana and by dusk they reached the Krestana-Andritsena
road, effectively cutting communications between the Italian 4th Mountain
Division and the German 1st Mountain Division.
As the whole operation looked much better than the previous day, Ltn.Gen.
Bethouart authorized Gen. Billote to attack by noon from Pyrgos toward Amaliada
under fire support given by heavy cruisers Dupleix and Augusta as well
as by light cruisers Brooklyn and Gloire. By nightfall, French troops were
entering Hanakia and Dounelika.
In the French 1st Army Corps sector, the battle was also favouring the
Allies. With French "Chasseurs Alpins" (Alpine Hunters) covering their right,
men of the 4th DIMM stormed Kariteria in the afternoon.
On the French 2nd Army Corps Kalo Nero - Filia sector, Yugoslav troops
began to aggressively test German defences and advanced from Dorio to Psari
on the Dorio-Andritsena small mountain road, covered on their right by
the Greek 3rd Mountain Brigade.
Allied planes were extremely active during the whole day, with medium
bombers and fighters attacking airfields and logistic dumps, and ground
attack planes concentrating their effort in the Megatopoli sector. Hard pressed
to defend the Athens region, the Luftwaffe was relatively absent from the
battle.
By 1800, considering enemy progresses, Gen. Dietl ordered German mountain
troops to regroup around Andritsena. By 2100 Gen. Obesrt Erwin Rommel confirmed
his order for a general attack in the Tripolis area.
Midway:
Major L.F. Henderson (USMC) leaves Midway and the VMSB-241 command to
go to Pearl Harbor and then to Nouméa to take command of a New Caledonia
based SBD unit in preparation for operation "Watchover".
Nouméa:
A B-17 crew reports in the afternoon having detected "a radio-signal
similar to the one produced by a German air-detection Freya radar" in the
Guadalcanal-Tulagi area. This report is sent to both R.Adm D'Argenlieu and
V.Adm Ghormley. By late afternoon a French PBY-5 takes off to check the B-17
report.
JUNE 23rd:
Algiers:
Arrival in Algiers of Soviet Ambassador to Great Britain, Ivan Maisky,
in company with the new Soviet Ambassador to the French Government, Alexander
Bogomolov. Both men have in the afternoon an immediate meeting with Mr.
Paul Reynaud and Gen. De Gaulle. The French government, while warmly welcoming
the arrival of a Soviet Ambassador and confirming that no effort would
be spared to allow Lend-Lease convoys to safely reach the Black Sea, immediately
raises the question of Polish prisoners in USSR. De Gaulle and Reynaud
point to the fact that Stalin's May 20th speech implied that Poland is
to be part of the Anti-Axis alliance. In such circumstances, Polish officers
and men still detained in Soviet Union are to be immediately liberated
so as to join Polish forces in exile. De Gaulle then states that if the
Soviet Union doesn’t feel able or willing to organise the new Polish Army,
men held in camps in Uzbekistan could be transferred to the Middle East
to be integrated as Polish units in French forces. France could not commit
significant forces to help the Soviet Union against Axis powers if in return
the Soviet Union would be unwilling to allow people ready to fight the common
enemy to join the alliance.
North Africa:
Allied planes maintain their pressure on the Regia Aeronautica by launching
two major raids against Tarento and Messine. 487 planes are involved in
both operations of which 12 are destroyed, for 7 Italian fighters.
Tarento naval installations are severely damaged during the raid.
Peloponnesus:
The day marks a significant turn in operation "Pericles".
In Western Peloponnesus, French troops are continuing to advance. The
5th RTM stormed the small town of Kalithea on the Krestina-Andritsena road,
and Amaliada was heavily shelled by Allied ships including the two heavy
monitors Erebus and Terror. The 10th Infantry Division moved toward Amaliada,
taking Korkousas and Kouroutas by the afternoon. In the French 2nd Army
Corps southern sector, Yugoslav troops moved north toward Likossoura.
On the French 1st Army Corps left flank, the 4th DIMM was stopped in
its advance toward Andritsena by a fierce defence of the German 3rd Mountain
Division. The 10th Mountain Division was however moving toward Dimitsana,
threatening German defences. However, the main event was the attack at dawn
by German 15th and 21st Panzer against 1st Army Corps positions around Tripoli.
By 0530 Ju-87s of I/StG3 and II/StG3 and Ju-88s of Special Kampfgruppen
606 and 806 struck French 1st Armoured Division positions. Air raids were
repeated all day, the Luftwaffe making no less than 475 combat missions
over Peloponnesus (the VIth FliegerKorps having been reinforced by the IInd
and part of the Xth) and planes of the Regia Aeronautica a further 212.
The Aegean Air Force was to fly a total of 1389 combat missions, of which
1031 were concentrated over the Corinth-Tripolis sector. In this massive
engagement by both sides Axis forces lost 47 planes, but the Aegean Air Force
lost nearly twice this number with 91 planes destroyed.
The 15th Panzer attacked north of Tripolis, moving toward Skopi and
ran into Gen. de Larminat II/1st brigade. By 0715 Pz-III of the 8th Pz
Rgmt helped by men of the 104th Panzergrenadier Rgmt were fighting SAV-41
and SAV-AU-41. Losses were heavy on both sides, but by dusk German troops
had penetrated Skopi. The main German thrust however was east of Tripolis,
where the 21st Panzer reinforced by the 115th Panzergrenadier Rgmt stroke
toward Steno, hoping to cut Allied defences at Agiorgitika. The German attack
began by 1050 after two heavy raids on the French 9th Colonial Infantry division.
The Carpentier Brigade had to fall back to Steno and, by dusk, the small
city was hold by a scratch force of Algerian riflemen and tanks of the US
13th Armoured Regiment.
Rabaul:
Rear Adm. Yamada, commander of the 25th Air Flotilla, signals to Adm.
Yamamoto that a force of 24 G4M1 bombers and 21 A6M2 fighters is to be
deployed from the newly commissioned airfield in Guadalcanal "...as soon
as Army planes could assure Rabaul's defence". He expects that the IJAAF
build-up would allow his planes to move by July 10th. A force of 10 seaplanes
and 10 float-plane fighters is to be deployed from Tulagi by July 1st.
JUNE 24th:
Washington:
President Roosevelt's adviser, Mr. Harry Hopkins, leaves Washington
for Algiers to bring a personal message from US president to the French
Prime Minister as well as a note from US Navy CNO Adm. King to Adm. Lemonnier.
Peloponnesus:
The battle assumes new dimensions this day. On one hand, Axis forces
are retreating in Western Peloponnesus under the unrelenting pressure of
the French 2nd Army Corps and part of the French 1st Army Corps. On the other
hand, the German offensive around Tripolis is developing in a very dangerous
way.
Air activity is still very intense, with Axis planes flying together
512 combat missions against 973 for the Aegean Air Force. Losses were high
on both sides, the Luftwaffe losing 31 planes, the Regia Aeronautica 11
and the Allies 69.
On the ground, a nasty battle developed on the relatively flat ground
between Steno and Agios Sortis. The 21st Panzer tried to cut the 9th Colonial
Infantry Division in two, hence breaking the Agiorgitika defences. By 0845
Col. Paul Robinett engaged his tanks toward Steno to try to relieve French
forces, which had suffered significant losses. Un-coordinated with infantry
units and without artillery preparation, US tanks attacking near the old
Tripolis airfields fell victim to German anti-tank and Flak guns, 21 M3 Grant
and 32 M3 Stuart being destroyed in a 90 minute battle. The Carpentier Brigade
had to evacuate Steno and the Brigade Dody began to retreat to Stadio. However,
in the afternoon, advancing Panzers ran into the Langlade Brigade (I/1st
Armoured Division) and Pz-III tanks began to fall to 75mm and 76mm gun from
SAV-AU-41 firing among olive-tree orchards.
North to Tripolis, the 15th Panzer resumed its attack at dawn and,
by noon pushed French troops out of Skopi. German tanks then moved toward
Silimna, but were stopped by French tanks and mechanized infantry at the
very entry of this small Tripolis suburb.
Contrasting with the situation around Tripolis, French troops continued
to press on in Western Peloponnesus. Just before dawn, the 4th DIMM attacked
again German defences at Andritsena with the 3rd BMLE support and penetrated
into the enemy's central position. At the same time, the 10th Alpine Division
moved east and north to Andritsena, and helped by the 4th RSM took Dimitsana.
The Yugoslav 1st Infantry Division was not inactive. Attacking on a south-north
axis Yugoslav troopers took Likossoura before noon and began to move toward
Andritsena. By late afternoon, it was clear for Gen. Dietl that the 3rd
Mountain Infantry Division was threatened by encirclement. He then ordered
his troops to retreat toward Stavrodomi to avoid being outflanked.
2nd French Army Corps units deployed in the Pyrgos Pocket maintained
their momentum both on the Western coast and toward Andritsena. The 1st
and 3rd Tabor Groups, helped by the 5th RTM pushed from Kalithea toward
Andritsena, rupturing the German 1st Mountain Infantry division defence.
By late afternoon, Gen. Guillaume and Col. Hogard could see German defenders
beginning to leave their positions. They then ordered their men into a night
pursuit. The savage Moroccan Tabor attack created great confusion. By 2235,
company sized units, frequently actually down to 50 to 60 men, penetrated
into German columns moving north under the cover of the night. Many small-scale
battles developed during the whole night, till 0430 on the next morning when
both Guillaume and Hogard called their troops to stop and dig in to avoid
running wild into the 4th DIMM advancing from east (actually there were some
cases of "amicicide" during this night, mostly when the 4th DIMM artillery
fired upon German positions from which Tabors had already outsted the enemy).
On the West coast, Italian troops evacuated Amaliada under Gen. Billote
10th Infantry Division pressure. The 4th Italian Mountain Division evacuated
Olympia soon after 1430.
By night fall the situation held many contrasts. After a meeting at
2030 in Sparti between Giraud, Ritchie, Norrie and Du Vigier, it was decided
that the British XXXth Corps would attack toward the coast to prevent the
Pafundi Army Group from supporting the German thrust toward Tripolis, and
that the 2nd Moroccan Infantry Division will join the Langlade armoured
Brigade in a counter-attack at Agios Sortis.
Nouméa:
Adm. Ghormley and R.Adm. d'Argenlieu, in the face of available intelligence
inform both Adm. Nimitz and Marshall Wavell that "...the enemy has probably
completed the airfields which were under construction near the Tenaru River
in Guadalcanal. There is now proof that at least one enemy air-surveillance
radar is operating in this area, indicating a possible build up of air assets.
If long-ange enemy bombers are based in Guadalcanal they could harass Esperitu
Santo and possibly New Caledonia. These planes will be a constant threat
for shipping going to Australia from the US West coast or the Panama Canal."
R.Adm d'Argenlieu sends on his own a signal to Algiers requesting that
"the question of forces allocated to the defence of French South Pacific
territories is to be reconsidered. If some naval infantry is not available
at short notice, I request the sending of at least one airborne regiment
from the strategic reserve."
JUNE 25th:
Algiers:
The French government officially presents to Soviet government representatives
Gen. Petit as its Ambassador to Soviet Union. Gen. Petit is to leave Algiers
the next day and to arrive Moscow by the end of the month.
Peloponnesus:
This day again would see mixed Allied fortunes in the land war. In the
air, operations went on unabated on both sides and 44 Aegean Air Force planes
were lost against 24 German and 5 Italian.
By 0600 Andritsena fell to the combined attack of Tabors (from West),
the 4th DIMM (from East) and the Yugoslav 1st Infantry Division (from South).
With the fall of Andritsena parts of the German 1st Mountain Division still
fighting Yugoslav forces near Kalo Nero and between the Likossoura-Andritsena
road and the coast were effectively trapped. The French 10th "Alpine Division"
still bolstered by the 4th RSM moved north to Dimitsana in pursuit of German
troops. On the West coast, the 10th Infantry Division attacked Italian forces
defending Andravida. By the afternoon, part of the town was in French hands.
The Italian 4th Mountain divisions had by then retreated to north,
trying to reconnect with the German 1st Mountain Division and to hold a
line going from Stavrodomi to Andravida.
However, the situation was far more difficult and complex in the Tripolis
sector and along the Argolykos Gulf coast.
By 0340 monitors of the 2nd Inshore Fire-Support Squadron had taken
positions in the Gulf north of Leonidio and began to shell Italian positions.
By 0430 they were joined by the British artillery. At 0545 men of Maj.Gen.
Brink's 1st South African Division, helped by tanks of the 32nd Armoured
Brigade began to attack but were met by a strong resistance. The advance
was slow and costly, but by noon had effectively tied up most of Gen. Pafundi
forces.
Under cover of a major show provided by the Aegean Air Force, which
maintained constant presence over the area, French forces counter-attacked
the 21st Panzer at Agios Sortis by 0630. Two Brigades of Gen. De Hesdin's
2nd Moroccan Infantry Division combined with part of the French 1st Armoured
Division (Gen. Langlade's Brigade) and remnants of the US 13th Armoured Regiment
(by then called Robinett's column) to crush the German spearhead. New SAV-42
"Belier" tanks were blooded for the first time when they met Pz-IIIs in small
fields and orchards west of Agias Sortis. The battle raged on all the morning
and during part of the afternoon. German tank crews found they were out-gunned
but were still able to inflict significant losses on attackers. However,
by 1645, German troops began to regroup slightly east of Agios Sostis and
French forces linked with the 9th Colonial Infantry Division holding strong
at Stadio, covering the road going south to Sparti, which was the main logistic
link. This road was still under the German artillery fire.
North of Tripolis, the German 15th Panzer launched limited attacks
to tie up French armoured units as men of the 22nd Air Landing division
attacked in Tripolis suburbs. The house by house battle raged part of the
day, with French light tanks (M3F) setting delaying ambushes among destroyed
streets. By 1730, however, Rommel called off the attack.
This move was probably linked to a second attack launched by the British
XXXth Corps at 1030. Supported by one brigade from the 4th Indian Division,
the British 7th Armoured Division attacked from Agios Petros toward Astros,
threatening to cut off Italian forces. By the end of the day the attack
was progressing relatively well and Gen. Pafundi asked for reinforcements
or authorization to regroup around Astros.
By 2200h Gen. Giraud decided to alter composition of both French Army
Corps. The 4th DIMM is to be allocated now to Ltn.Gen. Bethouart 2nd Army
Corps and the 3rd BMLE given back to this same Corps. The 10th Alpine Division
is to stay with the 1st Corps to cover its left flank as the Battle for
Tripolis is to rage for some time. After conferring with Gen. Ritchie,
Gen. Norrie and with Ltn. Gen Du Vigier (the 1st Army Corps commander)
Giraud orders Bethouart to “constitute a powerful grouping with our mountain
troops and push forward as strong and as fast you can.”
Giraud’s feelings then are quite clear. The French 1st Corps was engaged
in a difficult battle to keep Tripolis as the 21st Panzer was aiming at
the jugular of the Tripolis Bulge. However, by holding strong for 24 or 48
hours he could expect to wear down German forces and still create such a
crisis on their right front that they would have to call off their offensive
and hastily re-deploy.
Saigon:
The Japanese Governor for the Annam region orders troops under his command
to implement a policy of "Terror and Destruction" as a reply to constant
attacks harassing Japanese convoys collecting rice crops among the Mekong
delta.