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May 18-21, 1942: The Allies immediately offer aid and alliance with
the USSR, as the Soviets fall back before the German assault.
In the Coral Sea, Allied forces meet the next Japanese spring forward.

MAY 18th:

Oran - Mers El Kébir:
French Battleship Strasbourg leaves under escort for Gibraltar and then Newport News, where she is to be refitted like her sister-ship Dunkerque.

Moscow:
In this second day of the war is announced the creation of the High Command General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of USSR (STAVKA). This new body tries to have a complete picture of the situation. German forces are battling through Soviet border defences and are advancing east. Luftwaffe raids against command posts and cities like Minsk, Grodno, L'vov and Byalistok are significant, but "operational activity" of the Soviet Air Force is too. The most serious situation seems to be, as Zhukov has forecast since January 1941, in the "Byalistok salient", where Soviet forces are threatened with encirclement.
Gen. Zhukov orders troop to “switch to the counter-offensive” once the German attack has been checked by defensive positions.

Washington:
Soviet Ambassador, Maksim Litvinov, in company with the Soviet military attaché, is received at his own request by US Secretary of the Navy F. Knox. Litvinov then gives to Knox a full situation report of current Japanese ground, naval and air forces deployment as well as a complete report of Japanese industrial mobilization planning. This report includes information about the latest Japanese naval programmes developed from lessons learned during what is called in Soviet military language "initial period of the War". The Soviet Military Attaché hands to Knox a full report of Japanese operations and tactics at Khalkhin-Ghol.

Rabaul:
The Port-Moresby Invasion force, under R.Adm Kajioka's command, leaves Rabaul.

Solomons:
After having sailed all the night under a crystal clear sky, USS Yorktown launches at 0620 and attack group of 12 TBD ("Devastator" torpedo-bombers) and 28 SBD ("Dauntless" dive-bombers") escorted by 12 F4F-3. Fletcher had decided to rely on the more experienced Lexington air group for the defence of his task Force, would the raid alert a Japanese carrier. Cruiser floatplanes were flying ASW patrol.
Each air squadron flew independently and so attacked the target according to pre-war naval practice.
Faster SBDs led by Lt.Com. Burch arrived first over the target and attacked by 0805. According to Naval Historian S.E. Morison:
"As usual, throughout the war, the pilots overestimated what they saw; all their swans were geese, and all their geese, ducks or goslings. Admiral Shima's flagship, a fleet minelayer, they took for a light cruiser, the transport for a seaplane tender, the larger minesweepers for transports, and landing barges for gunboats; only the two destroyers present were correctly identified."
Dive-bombers damaged severely Destroyer Kikuzuki, which had to be beached but, being washed out later by the tide, ultimately sank. Two small minesweepers were sunk in this strike. Torpedo-bombers attacked at 0810, but were just able to sink the converted minesweeper Tama Maru. Other dive-bombers attacked then but achieved little, at best slightly damaging two other ships. By 0921 all planes had landed safely on Yorktown and were immediately re-armed for a second attack.
The second strike consisted of 27 SBDs, 11 TBDs and 6 escort F4F-3. Planes took-off by 1030. They damaged one patrol craft and destroyed two seaplanes anchored off Makambo Island in Tulagi Harbour, where three other were seen. One TBD was lost to AA fire.
Admiral Fletcher then ordered four fighters to get the surviving seaplanes, which they did in the afternoon. They also strafed destroyer Yuzuki, killing her captain and part of her bridge personnel but the ship got away with just slight damage. Two F4F-3 became separated from the rest and crash-landed on Guadalcanal's South coast, from where they were rescued during the night by destroyer Hammann.

Brisbane:
French cruiser Jeanne d'Arc leaves Brisbane to Nouméa.

MAY 19th:

Washington:
Soviet Ambassador, M. Maxim Litvinov is received by Secretary of State Mr. Cordell Hull who confirms to him USSR eligibility "Lend-Lease".

Great-Britain:
During the night of May 19 to 20, 197 RAF Bomber Command planes hit Mannheim. However, few bombs are dropped on the actual target and 11 planes are lost to AA guns or German night fighters.

Algiers:
Gen. Charles de Gaulle, French Minister of War, and his staff depart from Algiers to London to meet their British counterparts as well as the new Allied Headquarters led by Gen. D. Eisenhower.

Another day of heavy air raids against Sicily, with 437 combat missions flown targeting mostly airfields. Allied planes lose 9 (of which 4 to AA fire) to 4 Italian fighters.

Minsk:
In the very early hours of the day, Gen. G.K. Zhukov arrives by plane at Minsk to help co-ordinate with Gen. Boldin a counter-offensive on the Byelorussian Front.
This day will be marked with large tank battles, in all three "Fronts".

Colombo:
At 2337 a loud explosion rocked Colombo harbour. A commercial oiler chartered by the RN exploded suddenly and burned fiercely for part of the night. Soon after battleship Royal Sovereign was hit by a torpedo under turret "A".
Culprit was a Japanese "midget" submarine, part of a group of three carried to Colombo by I-16, I-18 and I-20. This group had left Kuching Bay ten days before. The submarine carried by the I-18 was unable to start her motor and only two boats tried to penetrate Colombo harbour. The boat from I-16 was lost for an unknown cause. The I-20 one was able to fire her two torpedoes and seems to have targeted first HMS Nelson, which was anchored not far from the oiler actually hit. However the two crew members were to die soon after intoxicated by vapour coming from the battery, probably damaged by the oiler explosion shock wave. The submarine drifted and was beached by the tide not far from the harbour.
This operation, which seems to have been planned as a diversion for "Operation MO", did not succeed in convincing Allied commanders that the main Japanese push was to happen in the Indian Ocean.

Malaya:
Deployment of the first production Ki-44-I equipped fighter unit. The 21 newly arrived fighters are to replace older Ki-27 and Ki-43 and to operate as interceptors to protect Japanese key installations.

Coral Sea:

From dawn on, USS Lexington and Yorktown were sailing south. R.Adm. Frank Fletcher had first thought during the night about sending two cruisers to "finish the cripples" at Tulagi but the order had been countermanded soon after having been sent at 0215. This was quite happy, as both cruisers would have been in full range of Takagi's plane if they had attacked the Japanese force at Tulagi this morning.
With daylight, Fletcher ordered his destroyers to fuel from both CV. The day was spent nearly without any incident but for a four-engined Japanese flying boat detected by Yorktown's SC radar and dispatched by CAP Wildcats at 1135. This loss was never signalled to V.Adm Takagi, who spent the day still racing along Solomon Islands east coast down to San Cristobal.
US sailors were quite elated about the Tulagi-Guadalcanal raid, as ship's gossip had even increased the tally claimed by Yorktown's airmen. Most men were quite sure ships were heading to Nouméa or even Brisbane and some days of liberty. But officers knew better.
At 1535 a Yorktown SBD found R.Adm Noyes group and dropped a message indicating a meeting point point for the next morning.

The Japanese were very busy on their side, establishing a seaplane base in Deboyne Island with seaplane carrier Chitose, so as to control the area between New Guinea and Australia. By the end of the day the base was operational, but has been detected by a Port Moresby based airplane.

Things began to heat up when Takagi's force rounded San Cristobal by 1800. Shokaku's Type 2 Mk.3 radar set (the German "Freya" radar set Japanese conversion) detected an "unknown" plane, which three A6M2 were to dispatch at 1814. The victim was the French PBY-5 n°3 of the Nouméa based E-24 flotilla. Before being destroyed, the plane had the time to send a short message stating she was under attack by carrier-based plane. Japanese ships were able to jam part of the transmission but the message was however heard by a VP-71 PBY-5, which was patrolling 90 nm west. This plane signalled Nouméa they had intercepted the French plane's distress call and moved toward the known patrol box attributed to the E-24. There was by then a 4/10th overcast and by 1847 the US plane transmitted to Nouméa that "at least 12 enemy ships of which one CV sighted". The plane's crew was then busy fighting Japanese fighters as the pilot tried to dodge interceptors through clouds and no more precise sighting could be made.
This message reached Nouméa and, by 2015 V.Adm Musellier transmitted to Fletcher:
"Enemy force including at least one CV rounding San Cristobal's end by 1900". Soon after he signalled to submarines Beveziers and Sidi-Ferruch to patrol the area between Guadalcanal and Rennell Islands.

Another important clue about enemy's intents was given by USAAF planes, which discovered Goto's forces south of Bougainville Island by 1640. A second sighting, this time of the Port-Moresby invasion force, was done by 1725. Five Cloncurry based B-17 had refuelled from Port Moresby at 1310 for a reconnaissance sweep in the area between Rabaul and the Solomons. These messages were duly transmitted and received, but arrived in the middle of the confusion created by the second Japanese air raid of the day on Port Moresby. High-flying IJNAF bombers proved extremely difficult to intercept to locally based fighters. The B-17 messages were not transmitted to Brisbane and to Fletcher before late that night and they didn't actually mention Japanese aircraft carriers.
At the same time R.Adm Crace's squadron had been sailing at 15 kts toward the Jomard passage. By 1835 Crace's ships were detected by a large four-engined flying boat, which carefully kept out of range from AA fire. The shadower left with the night and, at 1935 Crace decided to reverse course for part of the night so to avoid being in a predictable position by dawn.

When Musellier's signal reached him, Fletcher had a meeting with his staff officers. The force detected by Nouméa based PBY was much too east to be the attack force. However, having discussed before with Crace and other RN/RAN officers, Fletcher was aware that the Japanese seemed happy to divide their forces as they did during the South China Sea Battle. Fletcher then guessed - rightly as it will appear - that ships detected when rounding San Cristobal were probably part of a support group, heading toward the main force, which he still assumed was to go for Port Moresby through the Louisiades Islands. He then decided at 2040 to turn northwest so to be by next day in a position to support Crace and to intercept this Japanese squadron. By then, the US Task Force was South of Rennell Island, by 159°45' and 15°05'. Fletcher detached DD Hammann to race to the previously fixed meeting point with Noyes, so to inform the Wasp Group skipper of his intents for the next day. Noyes was reached and informed by blinker just before midnight and altered course accordingly. However, this would mean that Wasp was to trail behind and slightly north of the two other carriers by 25nm to nm for all the 20th. Hammann raced back to TG.17 main group, and met by 0630 on the next morning. Fletcher decided too to send oiler Neosho escorted by DD Sims south, not to put both ships (and particularly the highly valuable "fat lady") at risk.

On his side, Takagi learned about Crace's ships detection by Rabaul based flying boats at 2210. The message he received mentioned "2 or 3 BBs, 5 CA and 5 CL". This could only be the main allied force and he put the fact that no CV had been sighted on bad luck from the reconnaissance plane or on to the fact that USN CV, which obviously had attacked the Tulagi landing force, had most probably sailed west during the day but had not joined with the main body when this one had been detected. Had Takagi been informed that a reconnaissance flying boat sent to the south of Rennell Island had disappeared, he would probably have guessed otherwise.

Pearl Harbor:
At 0300 CINCPAC office received a message transmitted "under the most extreme urgency" by Adm. King's staff in Washington (where it was 0800). Because of the code used the message was not deciphered before 0400 and transmitted to Adm. Nimitz, who has been waken up by then at 0415. The message stated:
"From highly authoritative intelligence source, Japanese forces operating in South Pacific are estimated to 3 or 4 Fleet aircraft carriers. Combined Fleet and two other Fleet aircraft carriers are still in Kure for maintenance work and crew training. Japanese Fleet not expected to launch any other major operation than the one actually developing in South Pacific before early July".
If Nimitz and his staff guessed what could be "highly authoritative intelligence source" they acted fast. A message was sent by 0510 to Fletcher (that is at 0210 on the 20th morning in the Coral sea).
By 0530 Nimitz had V.Adm Bill Halsey awake - and in a bear's mood - in his office. USS Enterprise and Hornet, which had just returned from their escort mission to Midway, were to sail at soon as possible for the South Pacific as Nimitz was seeing a golden opportunity to crush an important part of the Japanese Navy.
By 0615 MP loaded jeeps were racing in Honolulu to raise all sailors still enjoying their liberty and, by 1232, Task Force 16 raised anchor.

MAY 20th:

London:
Long and arduous discussion between US, British and French representatives about future operations. If the US government was pushing for a landing on northern France, it was obvious that at least one year was needed to accumulate enough personnel and equipment for such an operation. The French proposal of a quick action against Sicily was adopted. The operation could be launched late August or early September, once enough troops and planes would have been accumulated in North Africa. The operation is code-named "Torch". Mountbatten's staff advocates a strong diversion to be launched on French coast by late August, both to draw some German forces from the Mediterranean and to get some experience for a major landing to be attempted in 1943 or 1944.
Conquest of Sicily had the main advantage to completely open the Mediterranean to Allied convoys going to India and Australia but could also shake Mussolini's government to the point that Italy could be forced out of the war by early 1943.
The emphasis on Sicily was not to imply a status-quo in Peloponnesus. French troops were expected to launch a new offensive by next June, to reach the Corinth Canal and fix as many Italian and German troops as possible in Greece.
Dodecanese was to assume a renewed relevance with the possibility to run convoy to Russia along Turkey coasts up through the Bosphorus and from there to Odessa or Sevastopol.
Future operations in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific are also discussed. The British delegation stresses the importance of Burma and the Andamans. As news of the battle occurring in the Coral Sea is anxiously waited for, all delegations agree with the necessity to strengthen the US-Australia line and to provide assets for a limited strategic offensive in the Solomons.

Moscow:
During the night, the STAVKA reviews results of the previous day counter-offensives. It becomes progressively clear that even if they had inflicted significant losses to the enemy they had globally failed to stop him.

At noon, the Soviet radio ("Radio-Moskva") airs the following message from J.V. Stalin:
"Comrades! Citizens, Brothers and Sisters! Soldiers of our army and navy.
It's me who is addressing you now, my Friends!
Since May 17 morning a perfidious military aggression by Hitler's Germany against our Motherland has been under way. All our military units are displaying a heroic resistance and are inflicting up to now unknown loss to the treacherous attacker. Still, it is true that the war is happening on the soil of our Motherland. We can explain it by the fact war began under conditions favourable for German troops and unfavourable to Soviet troops. Germany was already fully mobilized for war. German forces moved no less than 170 divisions against our borders. Fascist Germany unexpectedly and perfidiously violated the nonaggression pact signed in 1939 with USSR.

People might ask: how could it happen that the Soviet government agreed to sign the nonaggression pact with such perfidious people and monsters like Hitler and Ribbentrop? Wasn't a mistake of the Soviet government?
Certainly not!
A nonaggression pact is a pact of peace between two states. Could the Soviet government have rejected such a pact? I think that no peace-loving state can reject a peace agreement with a neighbouring power, even if this power is governed by such monsters and cannibals like Hitler and Ribbentrop.
What did we gain by signing the nonaggression pact with Germany? We ensured peace for our country for two year and a half and we gained more time to prepare our armed force for repelling an attack in case Hitler took the risk of invading our country. The time we gained is a victory for us and a defeat for Fascist Germany.

What this war means for all of us? First of all it is necessary that our people, Soviet people, realize the gravity of the threat and abandon peacetime habits. The enemy is wicked and inexorable. His goal is to occupy our lands, cultivated with our sweat, to capture our wheat and our oil, obtained by our labour. His goal is to restore the power of tsarist landlords and destroy our national cultures and identities of Russians, Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Uzbeks, Tatars, Moldavians, Armenians, Azerbaijani and other free people of the Soviet Union and turns them into slaves for German barons. What is at stake is the life and death of the Soviet state, the life and death of the people of the USSR, and whether the peoples of the Soviet Union will be free or enslaved.
There will be no place for whiners and cowards, alarmists and deserters. It is necessary that all rise to join our patriotic war with enthusiasm, dedication and discipline. The Red Army and Navy and all the citizens should defend every inch of the Soviet soil, fight till the last drop of blood for our cities and villages, display courage, initiative and discipline. We should organise everything to help the Red Army. We will turn our country into the most powerful of all fortresses.
Is this war just another war? No, it is not. War against Fascist Germany is not to be viewed as an ordinary war. It is more than just a war between two armies. It is the great war of all the Soviet people against German Fascist aggression. The goal of the war is not just to eliminate the danger to our country but also to help all the peoples of Europe in their fight against Fascism. We are not alone in this struggle. We have true allies, the peoples of Europe and America, including the German people enslaved by Hitler and his henchmen. Our struggle will merge with the one of all the peoples of Europe and America. This will be the joint front of peoples, standing for freedom against slavery. In connection with this, Great Britain's prime minister, Winston Churchill gave a historic speech promising aid to the Soviet Union. There have been too historic declarations of governments of the United States and Fighting France. There is a feeling of gratitude in the hearts of the peoples of the Soviet Union for this support. We will fight side by side till the victory.

Comrades! Our forces are invincible. Rise to fight the enemy, to defend the Motherland, to defeat Fascism and Barbary.
Our entire strength - for support of our heroic Red Army, our Glorious Red Navy.
The entire strength of the people - for destruction of the enemy!
Forward, to our victory (Vpered, na pobedu!)."

Yokosuka:
First flight of the prototype of the new Aichi Torpedo and Dive-Bomber plane, corresponding to the 16-Shi programme. This plane is expected to equip a new generation of IJN aircraft carriers.

Coral Sea:

By 0225 R.Adm Fletcher was awakened when the CINCPAC urgent message arrived. Its content was clear:
"Enemy forces operating in South Pacific area estimated at 3 to 4 Fleet aircraft-carriers. At least two ships are supposed to be radar-equipped. Assume enemy radar performances to be on par with our own sets. Governs yourself accordingly."
A staff conference was held between 0240 and 0320. Fletcher then remarked that Japanese tactics seemed to imply that CV groups were to be separated with one directly supporting the attack force and the other acting as a covering force. He added that this disposition had foiled the late Adm. Phillips last December when part of his decisions were made on the assumption he was just facing one CV group. Fletcher concluded that the CV group identified South of the Solomons would in all probability be the covering one, but that the Port-Moresby attack force would have most probably to be given at least one or may be two carriers. There was then a strong possibility that the US Task Force would have to face by daylight 2 or 3 enemy carriers, but that R.Adm Crace would probably have to face one or two enemy carriers. For some agonising minutes Fletcher and his staff asked themselves if they had to break radio silence to warn Crace of his possible predicament. In the end, Fletcher decided to send a short message to Crace warning him of possible heavy air attack by one or two enemy carriers operating southeast of New Britain. He then ordered every body to bed, including himself, but asked Yorktown captain and air-group commander to prepare a comprehensive search pattern for dawn.

The message was sent, and received by Crace at 0332 as he was sailing southeast. For the British admiral it was however just a confirmation of his fears. However, Crace felt that he could not open the range too much, so to be in a position to intercept the Japanese attacking forces by night once it would have crossed the Jomard Passage. He then decided at 0430 to reverse course.

At the same time V.Adm. Takagi launched the "pre-dawn" reconnaissance flight from a position at 159°30' and 11°15'. Floatplanes from IJN CruDiv 5th and 7th were to assume a search pattern west and south-west of the Solomons and up to Rossel Island, covering the expected position of the US carrier force, which had struck at Tulagi and would probably be racing toward its main combat group.

Fletcher and Fitch launched their own search effort a bit latter. US carriers were at 157°30' and 12°10' when 18 reconnaissance planes were launched at 0525. By 0555 came from Brisbane the news of the Japanese midget submarines attack on Colombo and Trincomalee. This feint came however too late to alter the path taken by the battle.
More or less at the same time 27 B-17 arrived to Port Moresby from Cloncurry to be ready to attack approaching Japanese forces. Four reconnaissance B-17 had already been launched, one of them detecting Goto's hips at 0750. The plane was itself detected by Junyo's radar but the CAP was unable to shot down the four-engined bombers, which fought a 10 minutes intermittent battle through clouds with a 6 A6M2 and was able to transmit sighting of "10 large ships including a large aircraft-carrier". This message was re-transmitted to Fletcher by 0835 but by then the US admiral was pretty sure his late night forecast had been vindicated as one of Lexington's SBD had detected "2 CV and at least 4 CA". Everything was set for a full day of fight, which had been divided into the "Eastern Coral Sea Battle" to describe operations involving both aircraft-carrier groups and the "Western Coral Sea Battle" to describe operations involving Crace's and Goto's ships.

THE EASTERN CORAL SEA BATTLE

Shokaku's radar had detected the US plane, but the CAP had been unable to intercept, being vectored to a wrong altitude. Japanese fighters would however down another Lexington SBD and one from Yorktown between 0837 and 0844. This was a watershed for Takagi. He had received a signal from Truk by 0550 that enemy ships could possibly operate south of him (this was the result of Fletcher to Crace message interception) but he had persisted in his opinion that US aircraft-carriers would have to be between his force and Louisiades Islands. He nevertheless reacted swiftly, ordering first Hiei and Kirishima floatplanes to be launched for a search South from his forces and then he ordered Hara and Yamaguchi to launch a strike directed to follow on floatplanes heels.

Fletcher himself has ordered a strike soon after Lexington SBD message.
By 0840 Yorktown and Lexington began to launch first their torpedo-bombers (9 from Yorktown and 12 from Lexington), followed by 24 Yorktown SBD and 22 from Lexington. Then, both CV contributed respectively with 8 and 9 fighters. After assembling, planes departed at 0915 for Yorktown ones and 0925 for Lexington ones. R.Adm Noyes launched his planes a bit later, sending 24 SBD, 9 TBD and 9 F4F-3, which departed by 0945.
Hiei floatplane n°2 was vectored to south, following tracks of incoming US planes and was soon followed by 18 B5N2, 33 D3A1 and 18 A6M2 for Hara's CarDiv-5 and by 30 B5N2, 31 D3A1 and 18 A6M2 for Yamaguchi's CarDiv-2. Japanese planes began to be launched by 0850 and departed by 0940.

As both sides were feverishly preparing for a fight, R.Adm Crace's squadron was sighted by 0825 by a large Japanese flying boats. Crace ordered his ships to assume the Air-Defence formation and ordered a turn south, hoping to foil the shadower. By 0925 he nevertheless ordered his ships back to their initial course.

When planes were launched, both fleet were roughly 90nm apart, with Takagi still sailing west and Fletcher North-west. Fletched soon altered course to the west too to open range and place his ships between the Japanese attack force and the "covering force". Weather was generally fair, but cloudbanks could locally reduce visibility. This favoured Hiei floatplane, which sighted Fletcher's two carriers at 0935 and dodged CAP fighters for 20 minutes, still vectoring the Japanese strike.
Yorktown's planes arrived first and found Hara's carriers. Shokaku radar had given some clues about the attack but visual sightings by the Japanese screen were excellent too. Lt.Commander Joe Taylor of VT-5 led the attack on Shokaku, and TBD protected by Wildcats went first as SBD followed. This attack, which began by 1025 fell short of expectation. Escorting Wildcats were soon outnumbered by A6M2, losing 4 planes in the process and VT-5 TBD launched their torpedoes from too far to be effective, still losing 5 planes to Japanese fighters. Shokaku was however hit by two bombs, one forward, damaging the flying deck and lighting a fire and a second one aft. Lexington planes went lost in clouds for some time and when they appeared over the Japanese formation at 1044 cohesion had been lost. Before being able to organise a coherent attack they were bounced by Japanese fighters, losing 3 Wildcats and 5 SBD. Torpedo-Bombers went however unnoticed and attacked Zuikaku. However, again, torpedoes were launched too far and were much too slow. One Japanese officer recalled that "We could turn and run away from them with ease". 6 SBD achieved to attack Zuikaku but scored two near misses. In the same time, Japanese fighters had jumped slow Devastators trying to disengage and splashed 4.
Wasp planes arrived 15 minutes later (1059) and benefited from a pretty clear view. Hiryu and Soryu fighters intercepted them but could not prevent dive-bombers to break through. Zuikaku took two hits, one at the island level and the second aft, ruining her flight deck and Shokaku a third one, on her fore lift. The torpedo-bomber attack was again a failure, and Japanese fighters could claim 3 F4F-3, 6 SBD and 4 TBD for the loss of 4 of their owns.

Both Japanese aircraft carriers had been disabled as combat ships, and could not operate planes. However, as R.Adm. Hara was to admit in his "Action report" improvements in damage control procedures and modifications made following Adm. Kondo's report had paid dividends. Fires were soon under control, even if Shokaku was to burn until the mid-afternoon. At no point were ships under risk of being lost at this time.

By the time both Japanese carriers have been hit, the US fleet was under attack. Fletcher had transferred command of air operations to R.Adm Fitch, who had more experience in that matter. First sign of the attack was given by Yorktown SC radar, which picked up a large group of incoming planes at 55nm northeast. However, the fighter-direction officer was not well prepared. Even if 9 Wildcats were launched in addition to the eight already on station over the fleet, fighters were again badly staged. Fitch had not enough fighters, and the use of SBD as patrol fighters to intercept enemy torpedo bombers proved to be a failure. What's more, radio transmission discipline rapidly degenerated, and when the Japanese second wave (Yamaguchi's planes) arrived the fighter direction became completely confused. However, all was not bleak for American sailors as none of Japanese attack planes had sighted USS Wasp and her group, trailing behind by now 30nm.
Japanese planes began their attack by 1105. Torpedo-bombers delivered a near perfect "hammer and anvil" attack on Lexington. No torpedo was launched at more than 1,200m most were at 900m from the ship against 2,000m in average during TBD attacks on Japanese carriers. Lexington's skipper, Captain Frederick Sherman, tried hard to dodge torpedoes, but the old lady had too large a tactical diameter. To add to her predicament, D3A1 came at the height of the torpedo attack. Two bombs hit, one forward and the second on the smokestack structure and more exploded along the hull rupturing some hull plates. Then, two torpedoes hit, one forward and the second at bridge level, both on the port side. Nineteen minutes after its beginning the attack was over.
Japanese Torpedo-bombers did not use against Yorktown the same tactics than against Lexington. This, combined with a much smaller tactical radius allowed her to escape without a scratch under her belt. However one large bomb hit the flight deck at the island level and detonated at the 4th deck level.
So far, Japanese planes had lost 30 of their own to US fighters and AA fire, and if Lexington looked badly shaken, Yorktown seemed to have escaped the worst.

IJN CarDiv 2 planes (Hiryu and Soryu) arrived by 1123. In the then reigning confusion, they were able to develop a nearly perfect attack on Yorktown. She took in quick succession three 551lb bombs from D3A1 (of which one fortunately was a dud) and suffered 7 near-misses, but more importantly, was the subject of what was described later as a "text-book torpedo attack" and suffered three torpedo hits, one port side 100ft forward the aft lift, the two others starboard, with one in the machinery space and the second near the bow, under the front 5in gun sponson. The ship was stopped dead, listing to starboard by 10° then 18° and bridge personnel were slightly wounded by splinters and shock wave of one bomb detonating on the flight deck.
Japanese planes then devoted their attention to Lexington, which took another 551lb bomb fortunately exploding when hitting the flight deck, as well as to CA Minneapolis and Astoria, which both were barely missed by bombs.

When Japanese planes left, they were attacked by Wasp CAP and they lost 9 planes, which combined with 12 ones destroyed by AA fire raised the total loss to 21, still much less than what CarDiv-5 group had suffered.
By 1145 situation was looking serious but not hopeless. Yorktown was dead in the water, and R.Adm Fletcher evacuated her by 1236 to USS Astoria. However, Lexington was still sailing and her damage control crew was doing miracles. She was listing 7 degrees, with 3 boiler rooms partially flooded, fires burning and her flight deck ruptured by the last hit, so her planes had to be recovered, when possible, by USS Wasp. By 1222, she had been put on an even keel by shifting oil ballast and all fires were under control. The damage control officer, Commander H.R. Healy, in a telephone report to Captain Sherman, even grew facetious: "We've got the torpedo damage temporarily shored up, fires are out and the ship back on even keel. But I would suggest, sir, that if you have to take any more torpedoes, you take 'em on the starboard side".
This was however premature. By 1247 a devastating internal explosion shook the carrier as gasoline vapours, released by one torpedo hit, had been ignited by a generator left running. Explosions followed, one worse than the last, destroying the Central Station and killing most damage control personnel, including Commander Healy. Fire spread between the flight deck and the main deck. At first, from the outside, everything seemed to be all right, as the ship kept sailing at 20 kts and repair parties were trying to put the flight deck back in order. A second string of explosions rocked the ship by 1445, wrecking the ventilation system and forcing engine room personnel out. Power was progressively lost, and the ship progressively slowed.

The battle was far from ended.
As Japanese planes returned home, to be directed onto Hiryu and Soryu decks, Kirishima n°3 floatplane has sighted Wasp group by 1121. V.Adm Takagi received the information by 1253 with deep consternation. So far, Japanese commanding officers had though to be facing 2 US CV as one was supposed to have been sunk earlier during the strike and the landing on Rabaul, and two others were known to be in Pearl Harbor after the Doolittle raid. Takagi then directed Yamaguchi, who was preparing to host on his two carriers the survivors of Shokaku and Zuikaku, to prepare a new strike.
Actually, by 1300 all Japanese surviving aircraft (including the fighting over the fleet, CarDiv-5 had lost 43 planes and Car-Div-2 32 or 75 planes on 250) have been recovered, and the most damaged pushed overboard to make room for others. Hiryu and Soryu were now hosting respectively 69 and 66 planes.
R.Adm Fletcher was facing a similar problem. Wasp had recovered what was left of various air groups. Crews who had participated to the morning strike were pretty sure to have left two Japanese carriers good for dead. This was leaving one to deal with. As Fitch had taken handed back tactical command as he was no more on Lexington in a position to exert it, Fletcher ordered by 1251 to Noyes to "double on the morning strike and get the last jap carrier for good".

Noyes had on board Wasp 65 combat ready planes, of which 12 TBD, 33 SBD and 20 F4F-3. By 1312 he launched a second strike with 12 TBD, 27 SBD and 6 F4F3 and planes left by 1335. He was emulated by Yamaguchi minutes later as Hiryu and Soryu launched at 1329 a combined total of 41 B5B2, 42 D3A1 and 18 A6M2, which left by 1402.
Weather was now deteriorating progressively, and a 6/10th overcast extended from Guadalcanal to Task Force 17. Wind was strengthening too.
Wasp strike was led by 6 SBD, which fanned out to find the Japanese forces. After searching among clouds, one of them from Lexington VS-2 sighted by 1451 two aircraft carriers sailing west. They actually were damaged Shokaku and Zuikaku. By 1503 the same plane sighted two other carriers and had soon to fend off 3 A6M2. Wasp strike actually divided. All TBD and 11 SBD attacked the already damaged carriers. Escorting fighters were unable to prevent A6M2 to slaughter the slow Torpedo-Bombers (7 were lost) and SBD were constantly attacked during their dive and were just able to put another bomb on Zuikaku. The last 10 SBD tried to find the two other carriers. By 1524 they sighted one carrier, which looked intact, and they dived on him. She was Hiryu and took two bombs aft the island as well as two near misses. Here again, the ship was not at immediate risk, even if the second bomb was to raise a fire it took more than three hours to control. However, Hiryu's flight deck was ruined to the extent she could not recover her planes, a fact which had serious consequences.

Japanese planes arrived over the now quite dispersed US fleet by 1525 and ran into a similar situation of a partly cloudy sky, obscuring and then suddenly revealing targets. Part of the formation was apparently attracted by the burning but still fast sailing (20kts) Lexington. At least 17 D3A1 and 21 B5N2 attacked and the poor Lady Lex took another three 551lb bombs and two torpedoes, one port at the aft lift level and the second starboard at machinery level. These hits doomed the ship, which sank by 1632. The two destroyers assisting Lexington were also badly hit, USS Morris taking one 551lb bomb behind the bridge as well as two 132lb ones aft and was stopped burning. Hammann was the worse hit, taking two 551lb bombs and one torpedo. The cumulative damage broke the ship's back. She jacknifed and sank in two parts by 1552.
Yorktown was sailing slowly (5kts) when she took one more 551lb bomb amidship and another one torpedo starboard, under the aft 5in gun sponson. This one stopped her for good. Flooding went out of control by 1645 and the ship was evacuated by 1712, sinking at 1805. The heavy cruiser USS New Orleans, which was assisting the crippled Yorktown took two 132lb bombs, one at the first funnel level, destroying one 5in/25 AA gun and killing 45 men, and the other on the float plane hangar, raising a fire which took 90 minutes to be quenched.
By 1541 8 D3A1 and 9 B5N2 attacked the Wasp group. Captain Forrest P. Sherman (not to be confused with Lexington's captain Frederick Sherman), dodged successfully torpedoes, but the carrier took two hits, one heavy bomb (551lb) hitting the deck at 15ft from the island and partly exploding on the 3rd deck and one 132lb bomb 30ft fore of the forward lift. This bomb created a fire, which took 15 minutes to quench but, by 1610 the ship was able to operate aircraft.

Results of second strikes were for both sides inconclusive. As report from the mixed Wasp attack group were quite confused, Fletcher, now commanding from USS Astoria, could not be sure of how many Japanese carriers were operating. The very size of the Japanese second strike was indicating that at least two CV had participated in it. If two Japanese flat tops had actually been damaged and were "in sinking conditions" as said by SBD crews, then the Japanese force was 4 CV strong. The second strike was pretending having hit two more carriers, but there was the distinct possibility that at least one or may be two could have been ships hit this morning. Fletcher had then to ponder the possibility he could have to face a still two CV strong Japanese carrier force, with just one damaged carrier at hand on his side.
However, Takagi and Inouye (in Rabaul) were also reviewing this May 20th events. Takagi had three of his four carriers out of operation and part of the second wave had to ditch around the Soryu as she was not able to recover in time all surviving planes. Through various air groups, Soryu had reconstituted her own and was fielding 22 A6M2, 21 D3A1 and 19 B5N2. This however was a pretty small amount of planes compared to the 250 strong force at the beginning of the day.
But, the most important point from Inouye's view was what has happened west to the carrier battle, south and north of Louisiades Islands.

THE WESTERN CORAL SEA BATTLE

R.Adm Crace had, as written here above, reversed course west so to put his ships in a position to intercept any Japanese squadron trying to cut across Jomard Passage. By dawn, his ships have adopted a diamond-shaped anti-aircraft formation and were steaming at 20kts. At 0810 Chicago sighted a twin-float plane swooping around, just out of gun range. This floatplane was coming from Deboyne Island.
Crace signalled he had been detected, and ordered his ships south so to open the range with a land-based Japanese attack planes.

At the same time, it is to be remembered that Goto's forces had already been detected by a Port-Moresby operating B-17.
USAAF planes were first to strike and, by 1045 Goto's ships were attacked by 27 B-17. Junyo's fighters raised to intercept and succeeded to shot 3 down, as well as inflicting serious damages to 5 others, but to the cost of 3 A6M2 destroyed and 3 other damaged (B-17 gunners were to claim 10 enemy fighters). Bombing was inaccurate, but the raid still greatly impressed the Japanese admiral because of the persistence of enemy crews and of the resilience of their bombers to fighter attacks.
Goto has been informed by 0840 of Crace's presence, even if the British Pacific squadron has been described as "2 Battleships, one Battlecruiser, 5 heavy cruisers strong". He then had increased speed so as to put Junyo's planes in range to attack what seemed to be a most formidable enemy fleet.

Crace modified again his course by 1155, probably thinking he was safe from land-based attack planes. He was 135nm south of Jomard Passage by 1338 when Renown's radar set detected 50nm away an enemy formation heading south. By 1358 eleven G3M2 attacked at high altitude but dropped their bombs inaccurately under a very heavy AA fire. By 1415 another attack occurred, this time by two groups of 7 and 9 G4M1, which attacked at low altitude with torpedoes. All ships began to manoeuvre violently, still firing against attackers, which lost 5 of their own. All ships evaded incoming torpedoes, even if Renown dodged one by less than 100ft. At 1432 21 high-flying G3M2 bombed Crace's ships, again without results.
Crace then turned west, as if going to Port Moresby. However, by 1458, he had been informed of Fletcher's predicament. There was some reason to think that, by the next day, his squadron could be the only powerful force between the Japanese attack group and Port Moresby. Crace then decided to turn south east to maintain his ships in a position to strike anything passing through the Jomard Passage.
Everything went well till 1550 when 6 twin-engined bombers dropped their bombs close to DD USS Perkins. Photographs taken from HMAS Australia proved beyond doubt they were USAAF B-25. These planes were actually part of a 21 B-25 formation from 3rd BG(L) and 22nd BG(M), which had left Charters Towers to attack the Japanese seaplane base in Deboyne Island and have been separated from other planes. The 15 others B-25 successfully attacked the base at 1655, destroying 7 floatplanes and slightly damaging Chitose, before flying back to Port Moresby to refuel.
Their raid was followed by one delivered by 12 Port-Moresby based P-39 belonging to the 8th FG, which shot up the 5 surviving float-planes and set fire to avgas reserves on the beach.

By 1705 another formation was detected by Renown's radar. They were 18 D3A1 and 6 B5N2 from Junyo. Goto has been informed of Crace's probable position by Rabaul based bombers. He had decided to join the fray and launched a strike as twin-engined bombers had not seemed very successful. Junyo was however relatively far from Crace and B5N2 were loaded with 551lb bombs as they would have been unable to carry a torpedo so far. Goto has been himself attacked a second time by Port Moresby based B-17 at 1602 when 18 four-engined bombers had repeated their morning attempt. Once again, Junyo's radar had allowed A6M2 to intercept attackers, but 2 of them had been shot down and four damaged for the loss of 2 A6M2 and two other planes damaged.
Junyo's planes proved to be more effective than Rabaul based ones. USS Chicago was hit at 1726 three times by D3A1 551lb bombs, once between the funnels, the second hit in the aircraft hangar and the third on the "X" turret. Two other bombs exploded close to her hull, seriously damaging her engines. Other cruisers evaded bombers by manoeuvring hard, and at least 5 D3A1 were lost to AA fire.
The ship was badly shaken, burning heavily amidship and had to stop by 1818. Through Herculean efforts, damage control parties got most fires down by 1935 and Chicago was sailing at 5kts at 2050.
Crace could be found himself happy to escape so far with just one ship damaged. He had learnt about the Deboyne Island seaplane base neutralisation and could then hope escape more troubles the next day, still maintaining his control over Jomard Passage. He ordered his ship to adopt a racetrack pattern for the night, 135nm southeast of Deboyne Island.

Events of the day were then a mixed bag. Sure enough, USAAF attacks against Goto had failed to hit anything, but Junyo was down to 9 A6M2 operational and 13 D3A1 (with 9 B5N2). This clearly was not enough to both fend off another day of land-based plane attacks and to destroy the strong enemy squadron obviously patrolling south of Jomard Passage.
V.Adm Inouye then asked the Port-Moresby attack force to reverse course so to stay out of land-based plane range, and he ordered Takagi to join Goto so to improve the support force capability. However, by 2030 it seems that the Japanese "MO" commander had already doubts about the whole operation as he ordered Goto too to turn back.

NIGHT OF MAY 20th to 21st AND MORNING OF THE 21st.

It is possible that Inouye was hoping for developments during the night or wanted to have a better view of the situation. However, this night was to bring its full share of confusion on both sides.

Events began first on the West part of the battle. By 2010 Renown's radar detected incoming planes. By 2030 flares, green and red, began to appear, as well as float lights dropped by G4M1. Everything looked strange and even in some way festive. It was the first time in the war, allied seamen were facing the night torpedo attack pattern developed by the IJN. By 2042 twelve G4M1 attacked the slow moving Chicago, which was escorted by HMAS Perth and USS Walke. The three ships raised an heavy curtain of fire claiming 5 bombers, but Chicago took four torpedoes in quick succession on her port side, and capsized quickly.

Retribution for her loss was exacted before 2200.
French submarines Beveziers and Sidi-Ferruch had been ordered to patrol between Guadalcanal and Rennell Islands. During part of the day they had moved surfaced at speed, diving only when sighting a plane. By 1630 the great number of planes sighted had forced both submerged. They were guided by the sound of bombs exploding in the water and, by 1945 had both surfaced again. Beveziers was detected and forced down by DD Hamakaze and Tanikaze at 2111. She escaped after 3 hours of depth charging.
Sidi-Ferruch on the other hand went undetected inside the Japanese screen and fired seven torpedoes (the four front tubes and the three-tubes aft revolving mount) on a carrier before being too forced to dive.
Zuikaku was hit at 2138 by 3 torpedoes on starboard side. The ship, already strained by previous bomb hits, could not survive. She sank by 2216. Despite a hunt led by DD Arike and Yugure, Sidi-Ferruch escaped. This success made this submarine famous as a "carrier-killer", after the sinking, shared with Casabianca, of Shoho off Endau in February.

This loss apparently shook Inouye already crumbling confidence. By 2355 he signalled Takagi to reverse course and "avoid running into submarine traps". When informed, Yamamoto countermanded this order and at 0510 on the 21st signalled Takagi "to pursue and destroy the enemy". There was then little chance Takagi could catch Fletcher, but orders are orders and he changed course west at 0630.
Range had actually opened as Fletcher, after the loss of Yorktown, Lexington and Hammann, and after having scuttled Morris stopped after her crippling damage, had set course west to join Crace. Despite her two bomb hits, Wasp was still able to operate planes. Fletcher had been warned of Crace's recent setback and hoped to join him by the 21st morning, to constitute a force big enough to deter any new Japanese attempt to reach Port Moresby. By 0630 the opposing carrier forces were separated by nearly 400nm and Fletcher was approaching Crace's position.

MAY 21st.

Occupied France:
The clandestine Communist newspaper "l'Humanité" publishes a call to armed resistance, disruption of all economic activities linked to the German war effort and preparation of a "general insurrection" against the Fascist puppet government in Paris in connexion with "all other democratic and progressive forces". In this "l'Humanité" issue is also published a column from Jacques Duclos, the clandestine CP leader (as the CP Secretary, Maurice Thorez is in Moscow...) claiming that "Republic is ours and communists are sons of Valmy as well as of the October Revolution".

Berlin:
Admirals Raeder and Doenitz held a meeting to review "Rosselsprung" results. Losses have been fare higher than expected and are to significantly affect operations in the North Atlantic, at least until end of summer. Only operations against the US East coast are proceeding as expected as only Type IX boats are used. Still, ASW forces operating from French Antilles, Puerto-Rico or Nassau are beginning to inflict serious losses to boats trying to operate at the entry of the Gulf of Mexico or Caraïbes Sea.
Doenitz vehemently opposes any other attempt to force Gibraltar Strait. The only solution to boost U-Boat forces in the Mediterranean seems to be transiting small submarines through the Rhin-Rhone canal, which already has been used for sending MTBs. However, only Type-IID submarines could get through locks. Here again, Doenitz opposes sending Type-II boats operating in Baltic arguing that they are necessary both for training crews and to balance a possible breakout of the Soviet Fleet.
Doenitz then proposes to build another class of small coastal submarines, which could be deployed to the Mediterranean or the Black Sea by using either the Rhin-Rhone or the Danube link. By increasing the Type-IID length from 144 1/4 ft to 172 1/2ft, Deutsche Werk in Kiel feels able to build a kind of "reduced Type-VII" with a surfaced and submerged displacement of 372 and 423 tons, and four 21-inch TT (and 2 reserve torpedoes). Range would have to be much shorter than for Type-VII boats but, with a longer hull, up to 45t of fuel could be carried giving a 4,200nm range at 12kts, which was more than enough either for the Mediterranean or the Black Sea. These small boats are to receive the Dutch "snorting mast" to operate fully submerged and could then be particularly suited to restricted waters. By using blueprints and tools already existing for Type-IID boats, Deutsche Werk has been able to promise relatively quick deliveries.
Raeder approves Doenitz's idea and 54 boats (27 for the Mediterranean, 18 for the Black Sea and 9 for training in the Baltic) are to be ordered from Deutsche Werk (Kiel) and AG Weser (Bremen), with deliveries to begin by early 1943.
(Actual dimensions of Type-IIE U-Boat are:
Length 52,56m, beam 4,88m, draught 3,73m. 371,5/423t. 2-shaft diesel/electric motors with 710/470 BHP/SHP. Max speed: 12,5kts / 8kts. Armament: 4 x 21-Inch TT and 6 torpedoes, 2 x 2/20mm AA guns. Crew: 29).

Helsinki:
Following a bombardment by Soviet planes of a Finnish naval base near Helsinki, the Finnish government declares that "a state of war technically exist between Finland and Soviet Union".

Algiers:
French Prime-Minister, Mr. Paul Reynaud and French Parliament speaker Mr. Louis Joxe receives communist former representatives to the French Parliament who were under house arrest in Algiers.
In the same time, Gen. De Gaulle, who is returned from the London Conference the previous night confers with the Marine Nationale staff on several issues related to future operations in South Pacific.

Peloponnesus:
Two violent raids against Tripolis launched by the Luftwaffe. Attackers lose 14 planes (of which 6 bombers) against 13 Allied fighters.

San Francisco:
French cruiser Lamotte-Piquet leaves San Francisco after repairs at the Bethlehem shipyard. She is to join the training cruiser Jeanne d'Arc and the fast cruiser minelayer Emile Bertin to form the nucleus of the French Pacific squadron, to be based in Nouméa.

Coral sea:
After some exchanges of messages, Yamamoto in the end came to the same view than Inouye and he signalled Takagi by 0910 to sail back to Truk. Reasons motivating his change of opinions are still unclear.
Inouye's position was motivated by the fact Takagi's force had been heavily depleted of striking air power. Even if Soryu, the last operational carrier could destroy, with the help of Hiei, Kirishima and heavy cruisers the large enemy squadron operating South of Jomard passage, never Takagi would have been in a position to effectively neutralise Australia west coast airfields. The landing at Port Moresby would then have been under constant air attack from land-based airplanes, and Junyo and Soryu would have been hard pressed preventing major losses among troopships. The fact that 12 B-17 had attacked Goto by 0835, losing one plane to Junyo's A6M2 (of which three were seriously damaged), but this time straddling Japanese ships could have added more weight to this factor. This could have motivated Yamamoto's change of view as well.
Another possibility could have been detection by Gilberts based flying boat of a two carriers enemy squadron heading clearly toward the Coral Sea. This was Halsey's force, sailing at speed from Pearl Harbor to strengthen Fletcher. Would Takagi be ordered to operate for two or three more days in the Coral Sea and he could well be surprised by fresher and more numerous enemy forces.
A third possible reason possibly weighting in both Inouye's and Yamamoto's decision was the South China Sea Battle memory. Western power's navies were known to be ready to engage in a fight even in seemingly hopeless positions. A Japanese victory in a surface engagement against a powerful squadron, even if very probable would have entailed more losses, stretching even more IJN assets.

In the end, whatever the reason, Yamamoto's order to Takagi signalled the end of the Battle of the Coral Sea, or more precisely of the two Battles fought independently. By 1010, Goto and the Port-Moresby attack force were called back to Rabaul and "operation MO" suspended.
But the end of the battle was not the end of the fight. The last blood was taken Japanese submarine I-26, which was part of the reconnaissance force sent toward Port Moresby. By 1055 the path of the submerged submarine was crossed by Crace's squadron, still guarding the Jomard Passage south end. Of the 6 torpedoes fired at what the I-26 captain though to be a "Battlecruiser", three hit HMAS Sydney on port side. The gallant Australian cruiser, which had survived so much fighting in the Mediterranean, sank quickly with heavy loss of life.